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Abstract
Social media channels operate in real-time and on a global scale. Yet many organizations
remain unskilled and/or unprepared in digital communication usage, which exposes the
organization and its brand to grave and long-term consequences. Through an in-depth
literature review, this thesis explores theoretical research on both organizational crisis
management and the practice of international public relations. It also reviews several
organizational crisis cases where social media played a critical role in either inciting or
escalating a crisis issue, positioning the crisis prominently on a national or global level.
Next by engaging in case study research of two internationally recognized brands, this
thesis examined how these organizations applied prescribed crisis response strategies,
utilized social media as a crisis communication tool, and managed the crisis issue on a
global scale. Findings indicate a variance in overall crisis management, and
incongruence between public relations theory and practice. The thesis concludes with
best practices for implementing a global crisis communication strategy using social
media, and discusses global implications for the public relations field.
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Chapter 1
Warren Buffet once famously said, “It takes 20 years to build a reputation and
five minutes to ruin it” (Quirke, 2010). Protecting one’s brand reputation is arguably the
most important cause for any organization; and when a crisis emerges, communication
scholars agree that the decisions made and actions taken will affect an organization, and
its brand, for a long time to come (Zalabak, 2009). For the hundreds of organizations
directly or indirectly impacted by a crisis each year, especially those with internationally
recognized brands, the ability to effectively manage both internal and external
communications has required the help of professionally trained experts. Consequently, by
establishing a reputation for having this valuable expertise, the public relations industry
has been thriving for decades (Toth, 2008). Yet as information technology quickly
evolves, remarkably changing how the world communicates, organizations and the public
relations professionals who represent these organizations, have struggled to keep up with
the rapid pace and global reach of emerging media channels (Solis & Breakenridge,
2009). As a result, organizational issues have been incited or have escalated to a crisis level, and brand reputations are now highly vulnerable to vastly publicized scrutiny.
Through an in-depth review of scholarly research on crisis communications and
by examining the emerging role or impact of new media as it pertains to a host of
organizational crises, this thesis explores the congruence between the ideals of researchbased communication theory and the current practice of crisis communications in an
online, global environment. Further, by closely studying two specific crisis cases
involving well-known international brands, this paper will analyze the organizations’
management of the crisis event, and it will detail how the organization, the global media,
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and other global publics ‘‘reported” on the respective crisis. This analysis includes a
review of highly-cited theoretical crisis communication frameworks, and questions
whether these sufficiently address the challenges of crisis management in today’s online,
global environment where most key publics have access to new media communication
tools. Finally, implications for public relations professionals as protectors and defenders
of an organization’s global brand will be discussed.
To begin, it is quite evident that organizations, large and small, have embraced
new technologies to help make various business practices much more efficient and
effective. However, there is also evidence that these same organizations have been
slower to embrace certain communication technologies, specifically new media channels,
partly because companies still lack the necessary internal talent and/or ability for using
social media as an effective communication tool. In fact, a PRWeek survey found that
one-third of organizations (all sizes) indicated that no one —not a staff member or an
external agency partner —was currently responsible for engaging in social media activity
on behalf of the organization (Daniels, 2010). Without dedicated resources in staff and in
budget, and without an established social media policy for how the company’s employees
can engage in social networks, companies have become greatly exposed to crises that are
incited or escalated through these new media channels. A 2011 study by BursonMarsteller, a global public relations firm, highlighted “the overall state of unreadiness”
despite the fact that most survey respondents (business decision-makers from all over the
world and from all sized organizations) agreed that the rise of digital communications has
increased companies’ vulnerability to a crisis (Lawrence, 2011, para. 6). Some of the
survey’s alarming findings included: (a) 79% of respondents believed that their
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organization is less than 12 months away from a potential crisis; (b) only half have an
organizational crisis plan and, of the half that do, most noted that there are gaps that must
be addressed; and (c) only one third have a digital crisis communications plan yet 81 % of
business decision-makers believe that new media’s role in “driving reputation” (brand
perception) during a crisis is on the rise. One business expert commented that the results
of this survey should serve as a “wake-up call” for all business leaders who are
responsible for defending corporate reputations and brand equity (Lawrence, para. 1).
Lawrence concluded, “We are now all in the business of crisis management. It is not a
matter of whether we will stumble online but of when we will each have our moment”
(2011, para. 17).
Preparation is the first step. Historically, it has been considered a best practice for
organizations to create crisis management plans to ensure the organization is wellprepared to strategically address a wide range of potential issues. It has been argued that
most issues can be anticipated by an organization because someone in the organization is
already aware of the potential threat (Grunig et al., 1992). However over the last ten
years in the United States alone, some of the greatest organizational crisis issues were
outcomes of devastating events such as the terrorist attack on September 11th, the
Northeast blackout in 2003, and Hurricane Katrina in 2005. Crises such as these were
not the result of anything within a company’s immediate control; yet thousands of
businesses, which include their employees and their customers, were dramatically
affected by these events.
After the September 11th terrorist attack, the rationale for revising an
organization’s pre-existing crisis plan was apparent. Certainly prior to this date, it was

3

highly unlikely that any company’s crisis plan considered how to continue doing business
if all planes in the Unites States were grounded, if all cell phone communications were
cut off, and if electronic banking was made impossible. In fact, it is well documented
that during this crisis and others such as Hurricane Katrina, most organizations had
limited ability to communicate with their employees, customers, and other key publics
(Argenti, 2002). Many organizations recognized the need to revise their plans after
September 11th but then, four years later, were faced with Hurricane Katrina. Two
researchers who studied “post 9/11 ” crisis communication plans commented,
“Unfortunately, much of the knowledge corporations gained from dealing with the
aftermath of the terrorist attacks was either forgotten or misused during the crisis
following Hurricane Katrina” (Hurley-Hanson & Giannantonio, 2009, p. 2).
Furthermore, business continuity may have been a major concern for companies after
September 11th but the immediate actions taken did not match the level of concern. In
fact, these same researchers referenced a 2004 report, "Disaster Planning in the Private
Sector: A Post 9/11 Look at the State of Business Continuity in the U.S.," which found
that, overall, organizations were still unprepared for disaster, with 25% of the 1000
responding executives indicating their organization did not yet have a crisis response plan
in place (p. 4).
Perhaps this provides some insight as to why many large organizations have been
equally slow to react to the issues emerging from new media. For the past decade, many
business leaders have taken the “ostrich approach” (Burson-Marsteller, 2011), viewing
new media as a passing fad or a means for family and friends to connect and share
photos. Yet during this same timeframe, the emergence of blogs and social media - from
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Facebook to Twitter to YouTube - has been the impetus for both positive and negative
brand discussions as consumers welcome the opportunity to share experiences and vent
frustrations. “Word-of-mouth” marketing is a growing trend and according to recent
research from McKinsey & Company, consumers are 50 times more likely to buy a
product after hearing a recommendation from a trusted source (Stein, 2011). But this
practice works both ways. With traditional media now fueled by the 24/7 digital news
cycle, these online conversations have become viral and have often resulted in national
and even global media attention. In fact, one person's lone, critical voice can spark an
outcry of disapproval, impacting the future buying decisions of hundreds or even
thousands. Dell, the computer giant, found this out the hard way. In a series of “Dell
Hell” blog posts, Jeff Jarvis single-handedly took down a brand during the summer of
2005 (Jarvis, 2005). As more frustrated customers joined in his blog vent, the national
media began to cover the discussion. In one month’s time, Dell’s brand status for their
best-selling notebooks (the item Jarvis had purchased) had dropped by 5% - taking it
from first place to second place (DiCarlo, 2005). In another infamous case, a blogger
posted a 21-minute taped phone conversation of his trying to cancel his AOL service.
AOL chose not to respond to his blog, yet the blogger’s rants became so popular that he
received national media attention from The New York Times and The Today Show
(Penenberg, 2008). Although Dell clearly learned a lesson from this experience, and
consequently made significant changes to its internal and external communication
practices, other organizations have not followed their lead. One might expect that any
other organization motivated by profit would want to avoid the public outcry experienced
by Dell or AOL. Yet, years later, there are still many otherwise savvy organizations that
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surprisingly fail to appreciate the global reach of online “voices” (from customers to
public interest groups) and how quickly these voices can reach multiple key publics
(Friedman, 2011). Certainly more organizations are experimenting with social media,
including creating Facebook fan pages in attempts to attract and secure loyal customers.
But many still appear ill-equipped to handle—and, further, defiant toward—social media
postings or comments (e.g. BP and Netflix which are discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 2). The outcome of such poor new media management continues to result in
negative brand publicity on a grand scale. Additionally, such issues result in stories that
never truly “go away” - living perpetually in an online environment. Consequently,
when a future or potential customer is shopping via the Internet and seeking current or
previous customers’ opinions, that new customer will readily find out about any past
issues or concerns with a brand or its products through the simple click of a button.
In order to fully appreciate the impact new media can have on an organization’s
brand and its global operations, particularly during a crisis event, it is imperative to
recognize the changing media landscape. The Economist magazine recently noted that if
Facebook were a nation, it would be the world’s third most populous following China
and India (Aula, 2010). And The Washington Post referred to Twitter as a
“‘democratizing force’ since it can quickly propel unknown individuals and their causes
into the public eye” (WashingtonPost.com, 2011). Indeed with Facebook’s 845 million
total users (McNaughton, 2012), Twitter’s 500 million total users (McNaughton, 2012),
and YouTube’s 4 billion views per day (Radic, 2012), social media cannot be ignored by
any industry, especially public relations. New media usage by average, every-day
consumers continues to trend upward as Pew Internet research now reports that 50% of
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all American adults are using social networking sites (Madden & Zickuhr, 2011). And
avid Twitter users include celebrities, professional athletes, and political figures from
local congressmen to the President of the United States.
Interestingly, new media have also changed many past practices of traditional
media. Sriramesh and Vercic (2009) noted that as Information Communication
Technologies (ICT’s) give rise to social media outlets such as blogs and video sharing,
thus changing the dynamics of access to media, many leading print media organizations
have needed to alter the way they report the news (p. 74). The same is now true for
broadcast media as most cable news organizations scroll related yet random Twitter
comments across the bottom of the television screen, and radio announcers frequently tell
listeners to “friend us” on Facebook. Arguably, the biggest change impacting the public
relations industry is the use of new media by journalists. For decades, the relationship
between journalists and public relations practitioners has been contentious yet mutually
beneficial (Sriramesh and Vercic, 2009). A 2011 study from Middleberg
Communications and the Society for New Communications Research found that although
journalists do not want to be contacted via Twitter, 69 percent of them (mostly from the
United States) said that they use Twitter as a reporting/sourcing tool (Robbins, 2011).
This particular finding is up 21 percent from 2010. Further, Waters, Tindall, and Morton
(2010) reported that the use of social media have led to a role reversal between journalists
and public relations professionals in that the former are now “pitching” the latter. By
using “media catching” services such as ProfNet and HARO (Help-a-Reporter-Out),
journalists will seek out specific information for news stories. Therefore public relations

professionals now must redirect their efforts to better facilitate online conversations
between the organization and journalists across the globe.
Although traditional media strategies are not defunct, the paradigm shift is
evident. The phenomenon of media witnessing has now turned “anyone with mobile
media technology into a potential testimony-producer” (Frosh and Pinchevski, 2009, p.
300). More specifically, a person no longer simply witnesses an event; she or he actually
produces the crisis report. In fact, it has been well-documented that Facebook was a
significant tool that enabled activists to mobilize and share information during the 2011
uprisings in the Middle East, even though Facebook’s management remained ambivalent
regarding its use for political mobilization (Preston, 2011). Additionally, social media
are now fundamental to organizing collective action. During the 2010 crisis in Haiti,
people from all over the world were able to text and tweet donations to help the
earthquake victims.
But with this paradigm shift of consumers as journalists and journalists as
bloggers, examples emerge nearly every day of organizations floundering in their
management of social networks or other online media. For instance, while the
aforementioned Middle East uprisings were taking place, the global shoe company
Kenneth Cole sent a tweet stating, “Millions are in an uproar in Cairo. Rumor is they
heard our new spring collection is now available online” (Parekh, 2011). Even though
the company was attempting to be clever, which is part of its overall brand-image, the
organization was surprised by the vast negative reaction on a global scale. Issues such as
this, and others which are highlighted in Chapter 2, have prompted communication
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professionals to warn brand managers about the “Seven Stages of Committing a Social
Media Sin” - stages that include gaffe, outrage, and apology (Parekh, 2011).
Of course, it should be noted that, beyond collective action, some organizations
have embraced and are using social media effectively for other purposes. For instance,
when global journalists covered the 2010 volcanic ash crisis in Europe (an issue beyond
an organization’s control), the European organization for Safety of Air Navigation
(EUROCONTROL) utilized social media such as Facebook and Twitter as successful
communication tools to keep journalists and the general public apprised (Evans, 2011).
Such effective use of social media should serve as a guiding example of how to keep key
publics informed, and how journalists are eager to share the organization’s news with
their respective online communities. As many communication experts have noted, when
key publics (including the news media) feel that they are being kept informed, the issues
are more quickly resolved and trust is maintained (Watson & Noble, 2008).
It seems certain that as communication technologies evolve and newer social
media platforms emerge (e.g. Google+), these channels will continue to play a major role
in issues management and crisis communications. In today’s media environment there is
a demand for transparency, authenticity, and responsiveness - and experts warn that
organizations that do not deliver on these expectations will quickly see an issue escalate
globally (Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008). Timely response has been a key tenet in
crisis communications (Nelson, 2011); but in a “real-time world” where customers will
readily discuss an issue online, the organization must respond much more quickly, even if
to simply acknowledge that it is aware of the problem and is looking into it (Ingram,
2011). However, if the organization fails to respond promptly, then some public relations
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experts recognize that the company could appear apathetic toward the situation, and its
key publics may begin to question the organization’s willingness to fix the problem
(Nelson, 2011). As for transparency and authenticity, it is no secret that the public
relations profession has faced many of its own credibility and ethics challenges, and the
use of social media can potentially exacerbate these challenges. In fact, new rules
associated with social media usage have already emerged (e.g. Federal Trade
Commission guidelines regarding disclosure of product endorsements). Additionally,
social media organizations such as Google and Facebook have been dealing with their
own consumer privacy problems. And as the competition among the social media giants
escalates, so too do the concerns surrounding this growing problem. For example
Burson-Marsteller, one of the world’s largest public relations firms, attempted to “out”
Google’s Gmail Social Circle feature by secretly pitching top-tier media outlets to run
news stories and editorials about how the feature “ostensibly tramples the privacy of
millions of Americans and violates federal fair trade rules” (Acohido & Swartz, 2011,
para. 2). Instead, however, this public relations firm itself was revealed by USA Today as
working on behalf of an “unnamed client” (many believe it was Facebook), leaving
leaders in the public relations field to denounce yet another ethical breach within the
profession (Elsasser, 2011).
The public relations profession is at a critical juncture. Some are already
proclaiming, “PR is dead,” and calling for newly conceived “connected communications”
practitioners (Forbes, 2011). Others have proclaimed that practitioners who are not
“onboard”—i.e., using social media today—will soon be left behind and out of work
(Battenberg, 2009; Solis & Breakenridge, 2009). With today’s complexity of social
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media and globalization, and in a time when crises are escalated by a digitally powered
news cycle and engaged publics, the public relations practice has never been more vital to
an organization. Therefore, public relations must demonstrate that it is uniquely
positioned and prepared to manage social media activity on behalf of an organization
(Battenberg, 2009; Ledder, 2009; Solis & Breakenride, 2009). Yet the aforementioned
Burson-Marstellar study (2011) indicated that many companies lacked experience and
institutional knowledge of how to engage online in real time (p.31). Unfortunately, this
includes seasoned public relations practitioners, many of who did not grow up using
online technology and have not sufficiently prepared to lead an organization through this
newer communication activity (Solis & Breakenridge, 2009; Paine, 2010). Traditionally,
organizations would turn to their public relations partners to guide them through this
ever-changing environment; but when these partners do not demonstrate the talent or
confidence in handling such issues, organizations are forced to find this talent elsewhere
- either in other internal departments or through the many emerging vendors that are
quite eager to serve in this capacity. In fact, a recent survey (Daniels, 2010) indicated
that when companies look to hire an external partner to assist with emerging media, most
consider direct marketing agencies, ad agencies, and digital agencies first. Only 16%
indicated that they would look for assistance from their public relations firm.
The profession’s overall slow movement on new and emerging media has enabled
organizational counterparts in information technology (IT) or marketing to exert their
own power and expertise. On a positive note, according to the 2010 Wright & Hinson
survey, more organizations have placed social media management under the public
relations functions: “81% said that's where it belonged in 2010, compared to just 66% in
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the year before” (Paine, 2010, para. 9). Now public relations professionals must
demonstrate vast expertise in new media usage, which includes the complexity of
communicating with global audiences. Sriramesh and Vercic (2009) have cautioned that
it is not enough for public relations professionals to fully recognize the media ’s power in
shaping public opinion on a global scale; practitioners must now also “understand how
the media operate in a variety of countries before developing strategies for conducting
effective media relations” (p. 63). Yet most public relations practitioners are more
comfortable operating regionally or within a controlled environment; they therefore tend
to apply ethnocentric or standardized approaches across various socioeconomic, political,
and cultural systems (Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 113). Such ethnocentric practices can
become especially problematic when applied in crisis situations (Coombs & Holladay,
2012 ).

It is the role of the public relations professional to change an organization’s
perception or misunderstanding about new media, and begin to engage and build
proactive online communities. By effectively using social media and engaging key
publics in two-way communication (see Chapter 2), public relations professionals can
continue to steer an organization away from crises, especially “manufactured” crises (i.e.
smaller issues that get escalated because the organization poorly handled or failed to
resolve the issue in a timely manner). But in order for the public relations profession to
be viewed as an essential and strategic component of any organization, its practitioners
need to accelerate their own understanding and comfort level with emerging media.
Unfortunately, to date, many of the current scholarly theories regarding crisis
management or the practice of international public relations do not yet explicitly discuss
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the impact of social media’s usage by global publics. Further, global crisis
communications and social media usage are two relatively new subject areas with limited
empirical research. Even the leading trade publication for the public relations industry,
PRWeek, only recently issued its second annual social media usage survey (2011).
Meantime, many organizations continue to falter in their handling of online
communications, and have allowed external voices to take command over their single
greatest commodity - their brand. It is not surprising that as communication experts
continue to review various organizational crisis cases, they have noted the gap between
crisis theories and actual public relations practice and have called for additional research
on this topic (Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2009).
This thesis explores current empirical and theoretical research on organizational
crisis management, and examines how the rise of new and social media in global
communication practices has affected great change in the speed and reach of crisis issues.
Following Chapter 2’s literature review and Chapter 3’s methodological exposition, the
thesis presents and discusses recent crisis events of two well-known global brands (in
Chapters 4 and 5, respectively) during which social media were used to either manage or
incite the crisis. Accordingly, this thesis explores how these organizations: (a) applied
crisis response strategies prescribed by highly cited theoretical frameworks; (b) utilized
social media as communication tools; and (c) managed the issue on a global scale. The
sixth (final) chapter offers a comparative analysis of the two cases and explores the
congruence between research-based crisis communication theories and public relations
practice. As well, it reviews recommended best practices for using social media to
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implement a global crisis communication strategy and considers implications for public
relations practitioners working in a digital and global world.

Chapter 2: Literature Review
A crisis as defined by Coombs (2007) is “a sudden and unexpected event that
threatens to disrupt an organization’s operations and poses both a financial and a
reputational threat” (p. 164). All organizations are at risk of encountering crises; but how
an organization effectively plans for crises and manages its crisis communication have
helped to solidify and advance the public relations field. The area of “issues
management” emerged in the 1970s, and many experts regard risk and crisis
communication as the core of public relations theory and practice (J. Grunig, Dozier,
Ehling, L. Grunig, Repper and White, 1992; Falkheimer & Heide, 2006). But the
complexities of globalization and emerging technologies have further advanced the need
for expert public relations practice. As information and communication technologies
(ICT’s) expand and as multicultural audiences converse and express opinions through
social networks, the Internet now serves as a facilitator and even a “trigger” of global
business crises (Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008). In fact, for the last several years
many activists have used online communication channels to foster their campaigns
against corporations (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006). Traditionally, as protectors and
defenders of an organization’s reputation and brand, the organization’s senior
management and its public relations practitioners were expected to anticipate potential
crisis scenarios and develop well-planned crisis communication strategies. However,
anticipating issues from the confines of the corporate office is no longer sufficient.
Organizations need to actively engage with their stakeholders or “key publics” in order to
better understand the perceptions held by these key publics, who are now global and
virtually linked through emerging communication technologies.
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Core Crisis Communications Theories
“Every organization, simply by existing, has relationships with publics and
therefore has public relations” (Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 215). Public relations
practitioners have used environmental scanning as a method for monitoring key
stakeholders’ (publics’) actions and opinions in order to identify areas of concern, and to
develop ways for the organization to diffuse a particular emerging issue (Curtin &
Gaither, 2007, p. 141). However, when a crisis occurs, key publics generally learn about
the event from the news media or, in today’s world, from online media. Both the news
media and Internet discussion will establish a crisis frame that limits or defines the issue
(Coombs, 2007). Therefore, public relations become essential and can demonstrate its
main value when managing crisis situations (Larsson & Nohrstedt, 2002; Falkheimer &
Heide, 2006).
As issues management took center stage in public relations, several crisis theories
emerged and, to date, these theories have provided the basis for the majority of crisis
communication research (Kim, Avery, & Lariscy, 2009). From Benoit’s Image Repair
Discourse Theory (1997) to Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory (2006),
these research-based frameworks have helped to provide crisis managers, particularly
those in the Unites States, with guidelines for how to best manage and design
communication messages during a crisis (Benoit, 1997). Each of these crisis theories
recognizes the importance of the media and how the media will frame the crisis if the
organization does not do its part to manage the communication process. For the purpose
of this paper, the following sections provide overviews of three core crisis management
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theories, which have been the basis for significant crisis research over the past two
decades.
Benoit’s Image Repair Discourse Theory (1997). Benoit’s theory, based on
previous studies of apologia (“the speech of self-defense,” Ware & Linkugel, 1973, p.
273), addresses how organizational messages should be structured in order to respond,
limit damage, and improve a corporation’s image in a crisis situation. According to
Benoit, “the key question is not if the act was in fact offensive, but whether the act is
believed by the relevant audience(s) to be heinous” (p. 178). Image repair discourse (also
known as image restoration) focuses on the types of messages that can be constructed and
delivered in a crisis, rather than the various types of crisis situations (Benoit, 1997). The
five major strategies of image repair include denial, evasion of responsibility, reducing
offensiveness, corrective action, and mortification (“confess and beg forgiveness,”
Benoit, p. 181). Within each major strategy, Benoit offered various versions for response.
For instance, he described six versions or approaches that a company could use to reduce
the perceived offensiveness of an action. These approaches range from minimizing
negative feelings to actual compensation for the perceived wrongful act. Benoit noted
that image restoration rhetoric is a form of persuasive discourse and that the powers of
persuasion are limited (pp. 183-185).
Some critics of this theory have argued that Benoit’s theory “may be clouded by
the false impression that the target is a discrete, completely-formed subject” (Burns and
Bruner, 2000, p. 31). These critics have called for a more audience-oriented perspective.
But Benoit has countered that the audience holds an important place in this theory and in
his research (Benoit, 2000). He argued that by prioritizing audiences (ensuring that the
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most important audience is appeased first) and by using different, but not conflicting,
messages for different audiences, a company can favorably influence multiple audiences
and keep its reputation intact.
Grunig’s Excellence in Public Relations Theory (1992). Grunig et al. (1992)
offered a theory on excellence in public relations in order to illustrate bow public
relations practitioners can best contribute to an organization’s success. As part of this
theory, Grunig and his colleagues argued that an excellent public relations department
would strategically handle the issues management function by building relationships with
key publics who can either constrain or enhance the effectiveness of an organization. By
building relationships and engaging in “two-way symmetrical communication” where
“both the organization and the public must be willing to accommodate the interests of the
other” (Grunig, Grunig, & Dozier, 2002, p. 315), a public relations practitioner can take
an active leadership role to anticipate and resolve most issues with key publics before
they become crises.
However, if an issue escalates to a crisis level, Grunig argued that by following
four strategic principles (including ongoing, two-way symmetrical communication) an
organization can effectively manage a crisis situation (Watson & Noble, 2008). Grunig’s
other core crisis communication principles are: (a) The Relationship Principle —the belief
that “an organization can withstand crises if it has well-established relationships with key
stakeholders” (Watson & Noble, 2008, p. 193); (b) The Accountability Principle —the
concept of accepting responsibility even if you are not at fault; and (c) The Disclosure
Principle - the commitment from the organization to fully disclose, once available, all
that it knows about a crisis or problem. According to Grunig, key publics need to know
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that the organization perceived to be at fault is attempting to do “the right thing.” If the
public senses that the organization is accepting responsibility, then these key publics are
less likely to take an issue to the media and more likely to remain supportive of the
organization (Watson & Noble, 2008).
Grunig’s excellence in public relations theory and its focus on two-way
symmetrical communication extend well beyond the management of crisis issues. Since
this theory is frequently cited by communication scholars and academics, it has also
invited its share of criticism. Critics have argued that even when two-way communication
results in a change of behavior or policy, this change or concession still likely leans in
favor of one party’s best interests. For instance, Roper (2005) argued that it should be
further examined if concessions made by the organization are “just enough” to quiet
public criticism or to help prevent the introduction of unwelcome legislation. From an
issues management perspective, businesses certainly prefer voluntary self-regulation
rather than legislated regulation (p. 83). Therefore, the change in behavior, even during a
crisis, may very well be self-serving.
Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory (2007). Coombs’
Situational Crisis Communication Theory (SCCT) draws upon Benoit’s Image
Restoration Theory and Weiner’s Attribution Theory (1985) whereby “a person attributes
responsibility for an event” and will experience an emotional reaction such as anger or
sympathy (Coombs, 2007, p. 165). For Coombs, the crisis situation and the
organization’s reputation are the focal points of his empirically tested theory. He posited
that specific types of crisis situations generate predictable levels of crisis responsibility —
attributions of the organization’s responsibility for the crisis (p. 168) - and are better
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resolved if organizations implement specific crisis response strategies that are aligned
with the nature of the crisis situation (Sisco, Collins, & Zoch, 2009). ‘The idea is to
match the level of responsibility and aid to victims in the crisis response strategy that
would be warranted by the crisis responsibility and reputational damage generated by the
crisis situation” (Coombs, 2006, p. 241). According to Coombs (2007), media coverage
is a critical component of the organization’s reputation management since most
stakeholders learn about a crisis from traditional news media or via the Internet. If the
crisis results in a change in stakeholder opinion from favorable to unfavorable, this
outcome can change how these stakeholders will interact with the organization (p. 164).
However, he argued that if the organization’s pre-crisis reputation is favorable, it will
have more reputational capital to spend and the organization ultimately “suffers less and
rebounds more quickly” (p. 165).
When developing the SCCT, Coombs noted his prior research (Coombs, 2004) on
reputational threat, which found that the stakeholders’ attribution of the organization’s
degree of responsibility for the crisis correlates to the stakeholders’ reaction. Therefore,
the more the organization is perceived to be at fault, the greater the reputational threat. In
order to assess the level of reputational threat presented by crisis type, he framed three
crisis clusters (Coombs, 2007. pp. 167-168):
•

The Victim Cluster —very weak attributions of crisis responsibility (i.e.
natural disasters, rumors, or product tampering by an external agent); the
organization is viewed as a victim of the event;
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•

The Accidental Cluster - minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (i.e.
technical error or equipment failure); the event is considered
unintentional; and

•

The Intentional/Preventable Cluster - very strong attributions of crisis
responsibility (including human errors) where the organization
“knowingly placed people at risk, took inappropriate actions or violated a
law/regulation” (p. 168).

Coombs cautioned that the organization’s history of crises and/or an unfavorable
prior relationship reputation may alter the initial reputational threat. For instance, if the
organization has had a series of equipment failures, the reaction from stakeholders will
likely move from minimal attributions of crisis responsibility to very strong attributions
of crisis responsibility (p. 169).
Once the crisis manager assesses the perceived acceptance of responsibility for a
crisis, SCCT further provides a list of response strategies along with guidelines for using
a specific strategy. Coombs (2006) noted that the “words used and the actions taken by
management affect how people perceive the organization and/or the crisis” (p. 171). In
order to protect the organization’s reputation, Coombs’ crisis response strategies serve to
shape attribution of the crisis and reduce its negative effect. He classified these strategies
into four areas - inform, deny, diminish (lessen the perceived severity by reframing the
crisis situation), and rebuild. Although certain constraints (i.e. financial resources) could
impact the strategy selected, and previous crisis history plays an important role, SCCT
generally recommends inform or deny strategies should be used in the victim cluster,
diminish in low or minimal attributions of crisis responsibility (i.e. accidental cluster),
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and apology/rebuild strategies in the intentional cluster (Coombs 2006; 2007). Still, he
cautioned that the use of rebuild strategies where the crisis manager says or takes positive
steps to offset the crisis to improve the organization’s image, is not always the best or
appropriate response. It is more important to maintain consistency and avoid mixing
certain response strategies that can erode the effectiveness of the organization’s response
(2007. p. 173). Coombs recognized that public relations play a critical role in an
organization’s crisis response by helping to develop the messages that are sent to key
publics (Coombs, 2007, October 30). But the role also includes the need to quickly
assess reaction from news media, for if the media (traditional and online) accepts the
crisis frame, the organization’s reputation is typically spared (Coombs 2007, p. 171). If
the media does not accept the crisis frame, and operate under a different media frame for
the crisis, then the crisis manager will also need to operate within that media frame
(2007, p. 173).
In most cases, the news media is the final arbitrator of crisis frames. The frames
used in the news media reports are the frames that most stakeholders will
experience and adopt. That is why it is critical that crisis manager present ‘their
side of the story’ to the news media. One exception would be crises that transpire
predominantly online. For online crises, people posting crisis-related information
to the Internet provide the frames. The people who post to the Internet about
crises include the crisis managers, influential bloggers, critics of the organization
and crisis victims. (Coombs, 2007, p. 171)
It should be noted that in an examination of crisis communication research trends,
Coombs’ SCCT was the most frequently cited or applied to other scholarly research (An
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& Cheng, 2012, p. 76). This theoretical framework will be further discussed later in this
chapter and will be reviewed in the case study research presented in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
Organizational Management of Crisis Events
Crisis theories can inform practice; but as the world navigates through greater
economic, political, and environmental challenges, it has become increasingly necessary
to have effective and competent crisis leaders who can instill public trust. Research has
shown that the general public’s perceptions of a given company’s chief executive officer
(CEO) or other senior executive spokespersons often align with perceptions of how the
organization is handling the issue at hand. For example, Hwang and Cameron (2008)
argued that the public expectations about an organization’s stance in crisis
communication is based on perceived leadership and perceived severity of threats. They
conducted a study using four fictitious corporate news stories to evaluate perceived
leadership styles (transformational, transactional, democratic, and autocratic) and severity
of threat (strong versus weak), and found that, based upon these different leadership
styles, the public will come to expect a particular stance taken by the leader in a crisis.
For instance, many members of the United States Congress took an autocratic stance
during the 2011 debt ceiling discussions; however, based upon public expectations that
Congressional leaders will compromise as well as decades of past debt ceiling
negotiations, most citizens had expected leaders to take a more democratic leadership
style. Hwang and Cameron noted that if the leader’s actual response and the public’s
expected response (based upon perception of style) are conflicting, then additional issues
may result. They recommended that if the organization is planning to take an advocative
stance during a crisis yet the public strongly expects an accommodative stance
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(democratic leadership style), then the leader should “seriously consider movement of the
stance toward a rather accommodative position to prevent any aggravated conflicts with
the disappointed or angry publics” (p. 3). Since the general public receives most
information about an organization’s CEO through mass media news outlets, these
researchers also recommended that periodic content analyses and reputation audits are
needed in order to stay abreast of key publics’ perceptions of the CEO.
Schoenberg (2005) also questioned if crisis management depends more on
preparation or leadership. He commented, “While planning is important, leadership in a
time of crisis, particularly in the immediate aftermath, may trump any preparation” (p. 1).
Communication experts (Quirke, 2010; Schoenberg, 2005; Weiss, 2002) agree that
excellent verbal and non-verbal communication skills are the foundation of being an
effective crisis leader. In most cases, the crisis leader will become the internal and
external spokesperson of the organization. Whether communicating with employees,
customers, investors, or the press, the spokesperson must have strong communication
skills in order to effectively build trust. Trust is of major importance in crisis
communication (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006; Semple, 2009), and currently the public’s
trust is deteriorating for United States businesses, government, NGOs, and journalists
(Edelman, 2011). According to the 2011 Edelman Trust Barometer, the firm’s 11th
annual trust and credibility survey, the top four most-trusted headquarter countries for
global companies were Germany, Canada, Sweden and Switzerland; the United States, on
the other hand, had fallen from fourth to tenth place in just three years. The news is
better for CEOs, however, who ranked among the top credible spokespeople globally.
With regard to crisis management, this annual survey indicated that in order for an
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organization to win back trust, “safeguarding customers and employees” was ranked by
global respondents as the priority, with “open, honest and frequent communication from
the CEO regarding repair efforts” as a close second.
Employees as company spokespersons. Although CEOs and other senior
executives are vital communicators for the organization, so too are the organization’s
employees.
Communicating timely and relevant information to employees - whether positive
or negative - before the public receives it, is a basic tenet of strong organizational
communication. Employees care deeply about their organization and have a sense
of ownership of the brand. This feeling allows them to be involved, feel valued
and be equipped to present our organization in the best light. (Lofgren &
Hernandez, 2011, p. 11)
The rapid change in communication technologies provides internal
communicators with a variety of digital tools. But if an organization does not permit or
enable its own employees to utilize social media at work, or if the organization does not
have an active Facebook page or a Twitter feed, how can the organization truly
communicate effectively in an online, global environment? Burton (2011) noted,
“Employee communicators are being more aggressive in pushing their leadership teams
to see them as strategic consultants” (p. 14). Rather than creating a viable social media
policy where engaged employees can become the organization’s best brand advocates,
however, many organizations are more concerned with lack of productivity. They
therefore continue to prohibit use of any social media tools. In fact, PRWeek noted that
only one in four companies encourage employees to use social media (Daniels, 2010).
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Further, a leading human resources organization, the Society for Human Resource
Management (SHRM), reported in 2011 that 43% of all sized organizations blocked
access to social media platforms from an organization-owned computer or handheld
device. They also found that larger-staff-sized organizations (i.e., publicly owned forprofit organizations with multinational operations) were even more likely to track
employee use of and block access to social media and other multi-media platforms
(SHRM, 2011). More progressive organizations, however, recognized that “a brand is
only as good as the people who deliver it” (Burton, 2011, p. 16) and invested more
money and effort into their employee communication programs. Employees utilize
YouTube, Facebook, and blogs for personal communications; and informed organizations
recognize that employees are likely to publicly comment on their employer. At Kaiser
Permanente, the integrated managed care consortium with 182,000 employees and
physicians, the organization appreciated its employees as its most valuable resource and
welcomed employees’ comments on its Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube accounts
((Lofgren & Hernandez, 2011, p. 12). Other organizations have accepted that younger
employees are often more advanced in digital technology usage, and assist their older co
workers on how to set up Facebook pages or Twitter accounts (Burton, 2011). One
outcome of these new workforce dynamics includes realignments within the
organizational structure. The 2011 PRWeek/Hill & Knowlton Corporate Survey noted a
trend whereby corporate communications departments were being flattened and
centralized (Gordon, 2011). For instance, Southwest Airlines had recently merged three
separate communication units - employee communications, public relations, and
emerging media —into one: communications and strategic outreach (Gordon, 2011, p.
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33) . It has been argued that such consolidation helps to improve public relations
practioners’ ability to respond to fast-paced information flows within and across an array
of social media, while also enabling the release of more consistent corporate messages (p.
34) .
As organizations prepare updated crisis communication plans, these plans must
address external stakeholders such as consumers and the media; but the plans must also
consider internal stakeholders from every level of the organization, who are now active
communicators of an organization’s brand. Additionally, when a given organization’s
communication practitioners are not aware of an online conversation about the
organization’s brand, there could be global implications for that brand regardless of
whether the organization is domestic, international, or multinational. This is because
“global reach’" now extends to anyone with access to the Internet. To that end, it should
come as no surprise that “global communications” hiring is increasing as “Employers
must look at every issue from a global perspective, not just from the viewpoint of the
home office” (Burton, 2011, p. 16).
Global Management of Crisis Issues
“International public relations ” has been defined as the practice of public
relations across international boundaries and cultures (Curtin & Gaither, 2007).
Although still in its infancy, international public relations is considered a top growth area
for the profession, with the concept of culture—“the process by which meaning is
produced, circulated, consumed, commodified, and endlessly reproduced and
renegotiated in society”—at its center (Williams, 1961, 1981; Hall, 1980 as noted in
Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 35).
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The practice of international public relations is an outcome of the globalization of
business (Ihator, 2000). With companies having a presence in multiple countries
(physically and/or virtually), it is now necessary for practitioners to “identify, study and
understand world views, mindsets, and habits of their global publics in order to
effectively communicate (Ihator, p. 38). Practitioners must understand that differing
cultural beliefs can have a profound effect on one’s perception of a public relations
campaign; and public relations in one country might be viewed as propaganda or
information in another country (Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 7). Scholarly research
suggests that propaganda and public relations are directly related (Curtin & Gaither, p.
55). For example, communications in the Soviet Era was viewed as propaganda —a mix
between persuasion and coercion (p. 54). This is important because “Public relations has
the power to create a particular type of reality; and that power comes with tremendous
ethical responsibilities” (p. 79). To that end, practitioners must also understand the news
media’s role and function within a specific culture, as this will vary and it would be a
mistake to assume that a Western approach (Barber, 1992) to media management will
work in every region or country (Ihator, 2000 and Freitag, 2002).
With globalization, organizational communication and crisis management have
become increasingly complex. First, corporations carry perceptions of their national
identity, which is different than the organization’s corporate identity or brand. For
instance, “The identification of Coke with United States has spread around the world ...
embodying the American dream: opportunity and consumerism (Curtin & Gaither, 2007,
p. 49). Curtin and Gaither (2007) noted that national identities develop through the
concept of internationalism, through relationships of one of “us” among many of “them”
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(p. 175). They added that if a communication campaign fails to establish a common
identity or meaning around an issue and its target audience, then conflicting identities
will arise (p. 46). Companies such as McDonald’s, Coke, and Nestlé are prime examples
of organizations whose national identities have been linked to social or political issues in
other countries.
Next, the degree of activism—“the variety of issues available for activists to seize
upon in a given society”—varies across countries (Kim & Sriramesh, 2009, p.83).
Sriramesh and Vercic identified activism as one of main variables of critical importance
to international public relations practice. They noted that societies have varying degrees
of media access; therefore, understanding the extent to which media utilities are
accessible to a particular society’s activist groups helps the international public relations
practitioner to gauge the amount of potential opposition (p. 74). For example, the United
States has more diverse and widely reported issues than a country such as China; but
Sriramesh and Vercic argued that this is the result of an “open mass communication
system” versus a “directed mass communication system,” where many messages are
withheld from an audience (p. 88). Accordingly, the more a society enables open
message-and-receiver systems, the more likely it is to foster higher levels of activism.
Freitag (2002) noted, “This is a 24-hr, interconnected world. Time zones and national
borders are no longer significant barriers to information flow” (p. 208). To that end,
emerging communication technologies such as social media can either exacerbate or help
to alleviate potential conflicts.
International public relations models. Curtin & Gaither (2007) noted that,
because organizations already exist and are generating messages, they must recognize
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that they can never begin any international public relations efforts from a truly neutral
starting point (p. 33). As noted, it is essential for public relations practitioners to
recognize how “public relations” is viewed culturally in one country versus another, and
equally important to understand the varying regulatory environments (Curtin and
Gaither’s, p. 226). Freitag (2002) argued that, in order to be successful in international
public relations assignments, public relations professionals need to have an appreciation
for and understanding of cultural differences (p. 210).
Over the years, several models or perspectives have guided the practice of
international public relations. These include:
•

Ethnocentric perspective —Proponents of this approach believe that public
relations is built around core principles that are unaffected by cultural
factors. Therefore, it should be practiced the same everywhere (Kinzar &
Bohn, 1985);

•

Polycentric/culturally relative perspective - Proponents of this approach
argue that public relations should be practiced differently in every culture
(Kinzar & Bohn, 1985);

•

Hybrid approach - Merges the ethnocentric and polycentric approaches
noting that some general public relations principles are appropriate for all
cultures/societies (Vercic, L. Grunig, & J. Grunig, 1993); and

•

Personal Influence - Public relations aims at establishing a personal
relationship between key representatives of the corporation and key
persons in the media, government, politics, and activist groups (Grunig,
Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, & Lyra, 1995).
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The personal influence model is used by many countries, corporations, and
government entities including Washington D.C. (Grunig, Grunig, Sriramesh, Huang, &
Lyra, 1995). From research conducted in India, Greece and Taiwan, Grunig, et al. (1995)
found this particular model (closely aligned to Grunig’s press agentry model) to be a
common public relations practice. In fact they found that in India and Greece,
“organizations tried to hire public relations practitioners who were among the elite of
society so that they had contact with powerful people and possessed necessary graces (p.
180). However, in testing the other three most commonly used North America models,
including two-way symmetrical communication (the “excellence model” in public
relations practice), the researchers concluded, “the two-way symmetrical model seems to
be more of an ideal, normative model than it is in the United States” (p. 182).
More recently, Curtin and Gaither (2007) have argued for an alternative approach,
which considers the role of relational power within an organization (p. 209). In their
view, “Public relations is a cultural bridge that must change and cannot ignore
economics, politics, or social issues on any level” (p. 24). When developing their own
model, they noted several points and key concepts. First, they discussed the “circuit of
culture,” which has no beginning or end. In this circuit, there are five moments in an
ongoing process (regulation, production, consumption, representation, and identity) that
work together to provide a shared cultural space in which “meaning is created, shaped,
modified, and recreated” (p. 38). Additionally, they argued, an organization’s identity
varies by context. Therefore each interaction it has with internal or external stakeholders
will contribute to its multiple identities. Finally, they noted that a given organization’s
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identity is less contested by publics if it is consistent with the organization’s actions (p.
172). This is an especially important concept for managing a crisis.
Cultural-Economic Model. Based on the circuit of culture and the premise that
public relations are predicated on communicative relationships, Curtin and Gaither’s
(2007) alternative model addressed a long-term perspective, and in their opinion, offered
a “new way of thinking” about the practice of international public relations (p. 206). The
following are key points from the Cultural-Economic model:
•

Culture, defined as “the process and space in which meanings are constituted and
competing discourses emerge,” is the center of the public relations practice (p.
206);

•

By understanding the extent to which the organization’s identity is already
established in a region or country, this model serves to guide public relations
practitioners on how to either build on that identity or create a new one (p 231);
and

•

Public relations professionals are cultural intermediaries —mediators between
producers and consumers who actively create meanings (p. 210). This does not
equate to becoming language translators. Also, the public relations practice is
regarded as a process, and its practitioners should expect and be open to change.
Curtin and Gaither (2007) acknowledged that changing behavior does not happen

quickly and noted, “in a digital world, the roles of producers and consumers collide” (p.
146). Information Communication Technologies (ICTs) have helped to create new
communicative environments independent of time and space (Castells, 1996). These
ever-growing virtual communities have presented opportunities and challenges for many

32

global organizations as ICTs have become the main medium for activist groups, enabling
them to become powerful and attract the organization’s attention (Falkeimer & Heide,
2009). As the balance of power shifts from the corporate office to the home of average
citizen, and as online media producers—including bloggers and amateur journalists—
become trusted news sources, communication flow is no longer “one-way,” and national
boundaries are increasingly dissolved. Today, when an organization has a specific public
relations challenge in one region, how the organization responds to that regional issue can
also affect its business or reputation in other parts of the world. This, known as “cross
national conflict shifting” (Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 23), helps to highlight how new
media are “altering the terrain for global public relations practice” (Sriramesh & Vercic,
2009, p. 75). The emergence of these new media utilities and their varied uses during
crisis management will now be reviewed.
Emergence of Social Media
According to Wright and Hinson (2009), “social media deliver web-based
information created by people with the intention of facilitating communication. These
social media now represent one of the world’s major sources of social interaction as
people share stories and experiences with each other” (p. 10). Social media include text,
images, message boards, photo sharing, podcasts, search engine marketing, video sharing,
Wikis, social and professional networks, and micro-blogging sites (Wright & Hinson,
2009). Some of the most common social networks include Facebook, Twitter, and
YouTube.
Wright and Hinson’s annual research on public relations practitioners’ uses of
social media continues to demonstrate that social media have had a huge impact on the
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practice. Solis and Breakenridge (2009) have farther argued that the advent of social
media has resulted in the “reinvention of public relations” (page 1). They view social
media as rooted in conversations, relationships, shared ideas, and common interests,
which offer opportunities to engage directly with customers and peers who either
purchase or influence the decisions of others. With social media, there is empowerment
for a new class of authoritative voices - influences - who cannot be ignored (Solis &
Breakenridge, 2009). These new influences are “regular people with expertise, opinions,
and the drive and passion to share those opinions” (p. 1).
Up until a few years ago, most organizations utilized traditional media outlets
(e.g. broadcast and print) to reach key publics. Grunig et al. (1992) referred to this one
way communication (sending, but not receiving) as the press-agentry model, which
generally strives for favorable publicity. As previously noted, Grunig’s “excellence
theory” requires the implementation of two-way symmetrical communication systems
that help to build or strengthen relationships, reduce conflict, and support cooperation
between an organization and its key internal and external publics. In two-way
symmetrical communication, “the public should be just as likely to persuade the
organization’s management to change attitudes or behaviors as the organization is likely
to change the publics’ attitudes or behavior” (Dozier & Ehling, 1992, p. 177).
A survey of Public Relations Society of America (PRSA) members indicated that
public relations professionals recognized that with the advent of social media there has
been a dramatic increase in two-way communication (Booz Allen Hamilton & PRSA,
2009). Solis and Breakenridge (2009) have advised practitioners to listen and become
engaged in the communities that affect a company’s relationships or authority.
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Additionally, they recommended that practitioners study online societies’ cultures in
order to observe how these societies interact with one another. “You probably didn’t
realize that part of your job is to become a Social Media sociologist and participant
observer” (p. 164). From their perspective, by observing first, practitioners can
effectively use social media to build meaningful relationships that contribute to the
company’s brand equity and, ultimately, the company’s bottom-line.
As noted in Chapter 1, new media continue to change the communication
landscape. The Web is no longer a place that merely distributes content by recognized
authorities such as companies, newspapers, and publishers (Teich, 2009.) The Web is
saturated with user-generated content; and it is common for bloggers, friends, or
followers to review or respond to individual products and customer experiences (Teich,
2009). In fact, it has become commonplace for consumers to post videos on YouTube
openly supporting, denouncing, or defiling an organization’s brand. Additionally,
consumer-generated media also challenge the traditional roles of journalists, enabling
global audiences to become active participants in the news process (Feng and Li, 2009).
This presents both opportunities and challenges for organizations and the public relations
professionals who represent them. Yet as an industry, public relations is not leading, nor
fully demonstrating, a level of comfort with these new communication tools. In one
PRWeek survey (Gordon, 2011), 89% of respondents acknowledged feeling increased
pressure to act as the “guardian” of their company’s reputation, yet only 27% indicated
that they are responsible for spearheading their company’s social media vision. In an
earlier PRWeek survey (Daniels, 2010), nearly 30% of respondents (members of U.S. and
international companies) indicated that they still do not include any social media tools as
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part of their marketing efforts; and of those who do use social media, almost 70% have
not made changes to a company’s products/services or marketing campaigns based upon
customer feedback gleaned from social media. Finally, while the latter survey found that
primary business uses for social media included creating communities (26%), an equal
number of respondents (25%) said that these tools are used to better understand the
competitive landscape. Perhaps most disconcerting is that a mere 14% indicated that they
used social media to monitor conversations by key publics; meanwhile, crisis
management did not even make the “top ten” list.
Unlike their business counterparts, nonprofit organizations seem to be engaging in
more effective social media usage. Many nonprofit organizations place advocacy as
central to their mission (Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 30), and social media provide a quick,
cost-effective way for these organizations to reach a broad, global audience. Research
conducted by Greenberg and MacAulay (2009) indicated that nonprofits are “increasingly
using social technologies to build networks of collaborators ... and to foster a new era of
creativity and symmetrical communication between message senders and receivers” (p.
73). Nonprofit organizations have also been credited for valuing the importance of
disclosure, or transparency, in their social network profiles in order to gamer public tmst.
To that end, communication professionals agree that transparency is essential in
social media and that digital communication tools should not be used merely as a vehicle
for repurposing marketing content and messages (Solis & Breakenridge, 2009).
Transparency is especially critical in crisis communication as brand reputations and
consumer relationships can be negatively impacted by a crisis issue. As Coombs (2006)
noted, “.. .reputation is a resource worthy of protection and a legitimate concern during a
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crisis” (p. 246). Generally, the need to control the message has been the priority for
many organizations, especially during a crisis event. Experts now argue, though, that
perception management should be the primary focus of most communications initiatives
as brand comments can be easily discovered online (Solis & Breakenridge, 2009).
Social media usage for crisis management. The use of social media can
typically satisfy three concerns for effective crisis management: timeliness of
information, transparency, and the ability to readily reach both internal and external
stakeholders regionally and globally. As blogs were among the first broadly used social
media tools, Sweetser and Metzgar (2007) investigated the impact of blogs on
relationship management during a crisis. Their research findings suggested that
launching a blog in response to a crisis may be an effective crisis management tool. The
researchers commented that just the sense that the organization is trying to effectively
communicate by providing timely and accurate information during the crisis (as
advocated by Grunig, 1992) may lead to a more positive overall impression of the
organization, and, as a result, the public’s negative perception of the crisis decreases.
Sriramesh and Vercic (2009) concurred with this school of thought, further noting that
through continued monitoring of the blogosphere, “organizations must engage bloggers
through open communication” and particularly engage activists in “real time” before a
crisis can escalate even further (p. 63).
As a cautionary tale however, some practitioners’ use of blogs or other social
media have become the direct cause for an organizational crisis. Bums (2008) cited
several high-profile companies (i.e. McDonalds, Wal-Mart, and Sony) that incorporated
fake blogs into their communication campaigns. Once these fake blogs were exposed, the

37

respective public relations firms had to contend with controversy in the blogosphere. In
the Wal-Mart case of 2006, the ethical issue was the public relations firm’s lack of
transparency about its involvement in an online campaign of two freelance writers who
traveled across America, parked their RV at various Wal-Mart parking lots, and
interviewed a host of Wal-Mart employees. The trip was legitimate, but ultimately the
president and CEO of Wal-Mart’s public relations agency was forced to acknowledge his
company’s participation in this RV adventure. In its failure to be transparent, the public
relations agency accepted full responsibility, and its CEO subsequently targeted the
online community through his own blog. However, Bums noted that one big misstep on
this CEO’s part - as was noted by some comments posted on his blog - was that he failed
to respond to the matter in a timely fashion. In the end, the CEO’s apology was not
believed by some, and appeared to be merely an effort by him for damage control.
Providing timely information is also critical during a crisis. An organization’s
prompt response often minimizes any damage to the company’s overall reputation. Social
networks provide readily available forum for organizations to distribute up-to-date
information from product recalls to evacuation procedures. But the speed at which the
world now communicates means an organization can also be quickly blindsided by
changing attitudes (Schwartz & Gibb, 1999). Additionally, as information technology
continues to connect various global cultures, the ideas and opinions expressed via one
communication network may reach worldwide audiences in mere seconds (Curtin &
Gaither, 2007).
Dissolving boundaries, space, language, time and traditional modes of
communication, the Web has linked people and information together more rapidly
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than ever before. This global regression toward mutual interests in cyberspace
has created new communities that revolve around issues and topics. In
cyberspace, cultures are temporarily reified by the innumerable worldviews that
are present and thriving on the Web. Any Web site is global because its audience
is global. (Curtin & Gaither, 2007, p. 58)
As organizations adopt social media to reach internal and external stakeholders,
for proactive outreach or to communicate during a crisis, it is important to note that,
although technology is more widespread, it is not equally distributed within the United
States or across the world. For instance, less than 1% of South Asia’s population is
online, even though it represents one fifth of the world’s population (Curtin & Gaither,
2007, p. 58). Furthermore, 60% of European business leaders have indicated that social
networking has changed the way people conduct business, yet only 45% are confident
that they are keeping up with technological change in their industries - a 15% drop in
confidence year over year (Beaubien, 2011, p. 4). This adds another level of complexity
for today’s public relations practitioners, as there is an increased need to build
relationships and communicate readily with local and global publics (“groups who share
similar values, norms and consciousness as world citizens,” Lee, 2005, p. 15).
When considering global publics, some experts have argued that today’s
multicultural context challenges traditional mass communication strategies and messages
(Falkheimer & Heide, 2009, p. 64). This is a valid point, but it does not imply that all
traditional strategies should be abandoned. Rather, communication strategies need to be
adjusted noting how traditional media (print and broadcast) and social media are now
feeding off of one another. For instance, in 2009 a TwitPic became the first official news
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coverage of an airplane landing in the Hudson River. But a recent study (Schultz, Utz, &
Goritz, 2010) found that in crisis situations, publics discussed what they read in
newspaper articles more than the blogs or tweets that they received. Still, since this study
found that Twitter users were more likely to share a message, the researchers concluded
that organizations looking to ensure successful crisis communication would be wise to
address Twitter followers.
Examples of new media usage in global crises. Crises often result from poor
communication between an organization and its key publics; and technology and
globalization have only served to intensify and accelerate the process of public scrutiny
(Curtin & Gaither, 2007; Falkheimer & Heide, 2009). Certainly there are organizations,
such as the aforementioned EUROCONTROL and Kaiser Permanente, which are
attempting to utilize social media effectively. Other successful examples include
international organizations helping to generate online donations for earthquakes,
hurricanes, or other natural disasters. Yet even in these charitable cases, some experts
(Ryan, 2011) have cautioned organizations that there is a fine line between philanthropy
and promoting a personal agenda. For instance, Microsoft had to issue an apology
following accusations that it was using the 2011 Japan earthquake disaster as a means to
promote its Bing search engine (Ryan, 2011). Ryan noted, “While social media is a
viable platform for corporations to help during times of crises, care must be taken to
ensure the intentions will not be mistaken for profit” (para. 7).
In reviewing several recent crisis issues that were incited by or managed through
social media, many traditional crisis communications best practices were applied. These
include communicating to employees during the crisis event, establishing ways for
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customers to receive pertinent information, and understanding that print and broadcast
media are critical resources during a crisis. Yet in one organizational case after another,
the reputation and global operations of several stalwart brands have been threatened as
unfavorable messages quickly spread through social media and, in turn, received mass
media attention. Social media played a key role in following prominent crisis cases
during the 2009 and 2010 timeframe.
Domino’s Pizza. In one of the first highly publicized “social media crises,” a
Domino’s Pizza employee posted a YouTube video (April, 2009) featuring the
preparation of a customer’s pizza in an unsanitary manner. Within two days, the video
was viewed more than one million times and, to the organization’s chagrin, became the
top search results for “Domino’s” (Hoskins 2010). Domino’s reacted to this issue by first
firing the employees in the video. It then strategically opened its own Twitter account,
and posted a YouTube video with a message from its chief executive officer. Despite
their quick and decisive response, it can still be argued that its 50-year brand was forever
tainted (Hoskins, 2010).
Toyota. In 2010, Toyota was forced to recall millions of vehicles due to reported
accelerator problems. Although the organization’s response time was considered late by
today’s standards, the company has been credited with effectively utilizing social media
tools to respond to the crisis (Hoskins, 2010). More specifically, the company opened a
Twitter account and used Digg.com to enable the company’s chief operating officer to
take questions and address public concerns. “This was a powerful exercise that
demonstrated Toyota’s willingness to be authentic and address consumer comments and
concerns head on” (Hoskins, 2010, p. 2). From Benoit’s (1997) perspective, it can be
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argued that Toyota identified relevant audiences and then successfully applied two
strategies - “reducing offensiveness” by attempting to minimize negative feelings
associated with the perceived wrongful act; and “taking corrective action,” which was
first addressed with the massive vehicle recall. Although the brand was tarnished in
social and broadcast media, many Toyota customers have remained loyal and, in 2010,
the company led global vehicle sales for the third consecutive year (Tabuchi, 2011).
BP/BeyondPetroleum. Global oil giant BP, an organization now synonymous
with “oil spill disaster,” is already a historic case of poor crisis management. Initially, the
organization did not appear to appreciate the power of social media. When the Gulf of
Mexico oil spill occurred in late April 2010, a fake Twitter account emerged @BPGlobalPR - gamering 137,000 followers by early June as compared to the actual
global BP account which had 12,000 followers (Breed, 2010). The fake account’s
postings were sarcastic and designed to make fun of BP and its chief executive officer
(whose integrity and authenticity were being questioned aggressively by broadcast
journalists worldwide). Despite this Twitter account’s surge in popularity, BP’s non
response was surprising to many communication experts (Breed, 2010). But the
company had already made many other public relations gaffes (Daniels, 2011).
According to one crisis expert, Michael Gordon, BP’s initial response—“a combination
of a lack of transparency, a lack of straight taking and a lack of sensitivity to the victims”
(Bergin, 2010)—was a perfect example of bad practice. Further, Reuters noted that BP,
an international company based in the United Kingdom, lacked knowledge and
experience pertaining to how this crisis would be perceived in the United States (Bergin,
2010). As a result, BP’s brand reputation was damaged and its independently owned gas
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stations in the United States, experiencing the financial impact at the pumps, began to
push for a brand name change (Corkery, 2010). One year later, however, this particular
crisis is being held up as a "‘fundamental landmark moment” whereby digital
communications came to the forefront as a crisis response tool (Daniels, 2011, p. 43).
Indeed, two months after the crisis occurred, BP hired a new global public relations firm
to help with its social media efforts (Daniels, 2011). It then launched its own Facebook
and Twitter accounts in order to document the steps it was taking to clean up the spill,
and by mid-August 2010 had 40,000 Facebook “fans” and 8,500 Twitter followers
(Daniels, 2011). Although several BP staff members were dedicated to responding to
social media inquiries (Daniels, 2011), it still remains to be seen if BP’s new
communication plan strives to follow Grunig’s “excellence” model (1992) and utilize
social media to build relationships through two-way symmetrical communication, where
the public’s interest is considered equal in importance to the organization’s interest.
Social media crises incited by consumers. The BP case may ultimately serve as
a landmark crisis case, but throughout the following year there were still many
organizations “surprised” by the power of digital communication. Interestingly, some of
the most recent issues are reminiscent of a popular line from a mid-1970s Academy
Award winning movie, Network: "I'm as mad as hell, and I'm not going to take this
anymore!" In an almost prophetic way, the movie’s key character galvanized the nation
with his fury and convinced his fellow Americans to get mad and shout this fiery
sentiment from their windows. Thirty-five years later, Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube
now serve as the public’s proverbial worldwide window, yet organizations are still
learning lessons the hard way - that is, by experiencing an otherwise avoidable crisis.
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Consumers, on the other hand, fully understand their newly found power. By organizing
and expressing opinions via social networks, consumers know that within 24 hours they
can have thousands of people following a discussion and expressing similar outrage for a
company’s action or decision. Netflix, Bank of America, and Verizon are three of the
latest examples of American organizations experiencing nationwide backlash to a fairly
common yet generally unpopular decision to increase fees. However, because of the
power of social media, these announcements quickly escalated to a crisis-level, gamering
both online and traditional media attention. Based upon the sheer volume of negative
consumer feedback and, subsequently, vast negative media attention for their brands,
each of these organizations ultimately succumbed to public pressure and reversed its
initial management decision (Choi, 2012). In the Netflix case, the company’s chief
executive officer issued a letter to customers attempting to explain the company’s
decision, and he did indeed apologize as Coombs’ (2007) SCCT advises for a crisis
within the “intentional or preventable” cluster. But this letter fell short of both
consumers’ and communication experts’ expectations, and ultimately backfired as publics
deemed the apology insincere (Lukaszewski, 2011).
Consumer criticism is nothing new, but a shift in power has taken place as social
media channels now provide the customer with an equal ability to have a voice and to
influence an organization’s behaviors (Friedman, 2011). Although Netflix, Bank of
America, and Verizon reversed their initial decisions, it should be noted that these are not
examples of two-way symmetrical communication. These crises occurred because the
companies were engaged in one-way conversations with their customers (Friedman,
2011). If any of these organizations had utilized social media networks to solicit input
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from respective customers prior to announcing a change in fees or business practices,
then, as Grunig’s research indicates, the reaction from key publics would likely have
been quite different, the crisis could have been averted, and the brand reputations of these
organizations would not have garnered further negative attention from such media giants
as The New York Times. Moreover, these businesses could have successfully
implemented the desired changes to move a profitable business model forward.
Theory versus Practice
Month after month, organizational crises are unfolding within a fast-paced,
online, and global environment. The examples thus far indicate that most organizations
had not effectively engaged in social media prior to the crisis event. Further, most
continue to struggle with the speed and reach of negative brand messages, which now
exist in perpetuity. Each organization’s seemingly poor preparation and fumbled initial
crisis response indicate a lack of congruence between the ideals of academic crisis
communications research and actual public relations practice. Coombs has
acknowledged that there has been limited research to test the crisis recommendations putforth by the Situational Crisis Communication Theory (Coombs & Holladay, 2012, p.
722). And, when tested, there has been notable evidence of the incongruence between
theory and practice. For instance, Fussell Sisco, Collins, and Zoch (2009) used Coombs’
SCCT to conduct a study regarding The American Red Cross’ crisis management.
Although best known for responding to crises around the world, this charitable
organization has also had a few of its own crises to manage - from management scandals
to questionable use of donations intended for victims of specific crisis events (e.g.
September 11th). In a review of articles from 1997 to 2007 regarding major
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organizational crises encountered by the American Red Cross, the researchers identified
which of the SCCT’s three response strategies (deny, diminish or rebuild) were employed
by the organization. For articles noting the victim or accident level of organizational
responsibility, the diminish response strategy was most frequently used. These findings
suggested that the Red Cross had overused the diminish strategy and the researchers
commented that the Red Cross had only chosen the appropriate response strategy onethird of the time. The researchers also noted that the SCCT would have called for the
diminish strategy in only 27% of the total cases. They indicated that the Red Cross’
frequent use of this approach was a means to generate a quick response to the intense
media attention of a particular crisis (p. 26). In their conclusion, they argued, “one cannot
but wonder how much more reputational improvement the Red Cross might have seen
had it incorporated theory into practice” (p. 26).
As previously noted in Chapter 1, many of the current theoretical frameworks
regarding crisis management and the practice of international public relations do not yet
fully address the impact of social media usage by global publics. For instance, the
cultural-economic model calls for public relations practitioners to be “cultural
intermediaries,” and some practitioners may be heeding this advice when managing an
organization’s proactive outreach to maintain and attract new publics. However, when
managing crises of global reach, most practitioners still appear to fall back on an
ethnocentric (Curtin and Gaither, 2007) or homogeneous (Western) approach (Barber,
1992). Further, many of the crisis frameworks referenced in this paper seem to promote a
homogeneous or “one-size-fits-all” approach to crisis management. For example, should
an international organization consider applying the “diminish” strategy in one region and
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"‘rebuild” in another? And what are best practices for reputation management when it is
so easy for key publics to discover conflicting messages online? Freitag (2002) and other
communication scholars have argued that if practitioners are striving to obtain public
relations excellence (Grunig, 1992), then there is a need for increased attention and
adequate preparation in international public relations practice - and this should begin in
colleges and universities.
In summary, “the overall state of unreadiness” (Lawrence, 2011) has exposed too
many organizations to heightened and potentially long-term reputational damage. Social
media have enabled local and global publics to readily congregate and demand
worldwide attention. Therefore, organizations need to take advantage of new
communication technologies in order to effectively communicate with their key publics.
Likewise, public relations professionals must engage in new media and assume a
leadership role. As defenders of an organization’s reputation, public relations
professionals must demonstrate an understanding of how to build and maintain positive
relationships with key publics in an online, global environment. By anticipating potential
threats to an organization, public relations professionals can help to diffuse issues before
crises emerge. However, if an issue escalates, public relations professionals must be
knowledgeable of best practices in crisis communication, especially those grounded in
theoretical research.
Crisis management, emerging media, and globalization are three variables that, in
today’s complex world, are directly related and intertwined concerns for organizations
and, more broadly, the public relations profession. Based on the preceding literature
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review and in order to prepare investigation of these three areas of concern, the following
questions were raised:
•

RQ1: How have specific contemporary international organizations handled
crisis events?

•

RQ2: What role did emerging media play in these organizational crisis
events?

•

RQ3: Did these contemporary organizations demonstrate a global perspective
in handling crisis events?

Chapter 3 details the methodology used to conduct case study research in an effort to
address each of these key overarching issues.
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Chapter 3: Methods
This research utilized exploratory content and textual analyses of traditional print
and online media to study two recent cases whereby new/social media played important
roles in the management of specific crisis issues that directly impacted companies with
internationally-recognized brands. The research focused on the use of new/social media,
both by the organizations in their crisis communication efforts and by key publics during
the same timeframes. It also explored the organizations’ communicative outreach to
various global audiences.
Theoretical Framework
There are several best practices, grounded in theoretical research, for how an
organization should manage its crisis communications with key publics. The selected
theoretical frameworks for this study are Coombs’ (2006, 2007) Situational Crisis
Communication Theory (SCCT) and Grunig’s et al. (1992) “Excellence”, two-way
symmetrical communication theory.
As previously noted, Coombs’ SCCT posited that public relations crisis situations
are better managed if an organization implements specific crisis response strategies that
are aligned with the nature of the crisis situation (Sisco, Collins, & Zoeh, 2009). He
maintained that stakeholder perceptions or reactions, which can be anticipated based
upon crisis history, will dictate which crisis response strategy or strategies (inform, deny,
diminish, or rebuild) will best serve to safeguard the organization’s reputational assets
(Coombs, 2007, p. 174). Grunig’s et al. (1992) “excellence” theory argued that public
relations professionals with the expertise, strategic insight, and propensity toward twoway symmetrical communication (which utilizes research and dialogue to manage
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conflicts) will ultimately build stronger relationships with key publics, including activist
publics. This research recognizes the inherent two-way communicative nature of social
media and understands that key publics now extend to a global environment.
Case Selection
Case studies are commonly utilized in public relations research and are especially
useful to “expand our understanding of theoretical propositions and hypotheses where (a)
the context is important, and (b) the investigator cannot manipulate events” (Yin 1992).
Additionally, Cutler (2004) noted that good case study research, if properly applied, can
be beneficial to practitioners as it can “balance the influence of quantitative research
which tends to isolate research problems from the processes of public relations practice
that are embedded in social or organizational contexts” (p. 365).
In an effort to provide public relations professionals with a useful comparison of
recent crisis events that were either incited by social media discourse or managed or
escalated by social media discourse, the researcher applied the following criteria when
selecting organizations for exploration: (a) the crisis event took place in the first half the
2011 calendar year; (b) the affected organization is a well-known global brand; (c) the
crisis events were different types (i.e., incited by or managed/escalated by social media
discourse); (d) major (historically legitimated) media outlets, both traditional print and
online, reported on the crisis event; and (e) the event was discussed on social networks
(e.g., blogs, Facebook, and/or Twitter). Using these criteria, the two organizational crisis
case studies selected for this research were Aflac® (March, 2011) and Sony PlayStation®
Network (April, 2011). The Sony PlayStation crisis event case involved an outside
entity’s network breach of the popular gaming system. The Aflac crisis, on the other
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hand, was incited by specific jokes regarding Japan’s tsunami tragedy, which were issued
by the organization’s “voice of the duck” comedic personality, Gilbert Gottfried. The
jokes were posted on Gottfried’s personal Twitter account.
Research Questions
Upon case selection, the following research questions were investigated to
address three key variables - crisis management (RQ1), emerging media (RQ2), and
global context (RQ3):
RQ1 : How have specific contemporary international organizations handled crisis events?
Ria: What type of crisis occurred (i.e. victim, accidental, intentional)?
Rib: Was the crisis incited by or did it emerge as a result of a social media
comment or posting?
Rlc: How quickly did the organization respond to the crisis event?
Rid: Which situational crisis response strategy (from Coombs’ SCCT) did the
organization first adopt? (Inform, Deny, Diminish or Rebuild)
Rie: At any time, did the organization change/move away from its initial crisis
response strategy (from Coombs’ SCCT?)
Rif: Did the organization handle the crisis proactively (get ahead of issue and
inform publics) or reactively (only responded when outside forces —government
or traditional media - pushed a response)?

RQ2: What role did emerging media play in these organizational crisis events?
R2a: What presence did the organization have in the online environment at the
time of the crisis event? (Web pages, Facebook, Twitter, blog, etc.)?
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R2b: Did the organization utilize social media proactively (get ahead of issue and
inform publics) or reactively (only responded when outside forces - government
or traditional media - pressed for a response)?
R2c: During the crisis event, did the organization (and its public relations
professionals) engage in two-way communication with key publics (per Grunig’s
Theory) in an online environment?
R2d: If “yes” to R2c, is there evidence to suggest that key public’s
behavior/attitudes were positively impacted by organization engaging in two-way
communications?
R2e: Was the organization’s leadership (i.e. CEO) negatively reviewed by
traditional and/or online/social media during or after the crisis event?
R2f: Was the organization’s brand negatively reviewed by traditional and/or
online/social media during or after the crisis event?
R2g: After the crisis event, did the organization implement any changes to its
online communications practices?

RQ3: Did these contemporary organizations demonstrate a global perspective in
handling crisis events?
R3a: Is there evidence to suggest that the organization handled the crisis event
differently in other countries? (ethnocentric, polycentric, hybrid approaches)
R3b: If “yes” to R3a, is there evidence to suggest that local and global
stakeholder’s perceptions/attitudes were positively impacted by the organization’s
handling of the crisis event differently in other countries?
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Content and Textual Analysis
This study sought to answer the above research questions by identifying themes or
patterns using content and textual analysis methods. Zito (1975) defined content analysis
as “a methodology by which the researcher seeks to determine the manifest content of the
written, spoken or published communications by systematic, objective and quantitative
analysis” (p. 27). In simpler terms, he noted that it is a quantitative method generally
used to count meaning units (words, phrases or themes in the text) to analyze qualitative
(written) material and to measure an attitude toward a topic (p. 37). Weber (1990) further
defined content analysis as “a research method that uses a set of procedures to make valid
inferences from text. These inferences are about the sender of the message, the message
itself, or the audience of the message” (p. 9). He noted that content analysis is used for
many purposes such as revealing international differences in communication content,
comparing media or levels of communication, and describing trends in communication
content (p. 9). Media content analysis remains a popular research methodology as mass
media have been shown to have significant impact on public awareness, perception, and
behavior (Macnamara, 2006). As Arya (2011) noted when studying print media’s
political influence in India, “This process is basically descriptive and certain well-defined
textual codes or elements are teased out by measuring the occurring frequency” (p. 100)
Still, most researchers recommend a combination of quantitative and qualitative
methodologies in order to “fully understand the meanings and possible impacts of media
texts” (Macnamara, 2006, p. 6). To that end, and recognizing this study’s concern for
cultural context, textual analysis (a type of qualitative analysis) of the media content was
also conducted. Textual analysis “focuses on the underlying ideological and cultural
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assumptions of the text” (Fursich, 2009, p. 240). Zhang and Wildemuth (2009) noted that,
unlike quantitative content analysis, qualitative analysis usually consists of purposively
selected texts and is “mainly inductive, grounding the examination of topics and themes,
as well as the inferences drawn from them, in the data” (pp. 1-2). Using historical text,
this researcher engaged in quantitative content analysis and textual discourse analysis to
ascertain basic themes that emerged from broad text.
Units of Analysis
The units of analysis studied include specific traditional and online newspaper
texts, as well as online postings from the organization, its customers, and influential
bloggers. Whole texts (i.e. headline and overall tone) as well as key statements within
each text from either the organization or its key publics were reviewed to identify themes
or patterns. According to Weber (1990), when reviewing for themes, whole texts are
acceptable units of study provided the text is short such as editorials or stories (p. 23).
Media Selection
The specific print and online media selected for this research represent a mix of
well-known, reputable communications and business media, and a variety of consumer or
industry blogs. An attempt was made to review the same media (e.g. The New York
Times) for both cases; however, as the studied cases are from different industries, there
were varying trade and global publications that covered these specific crisis events.
Additionally, the different styles of crisis response attracted the attention of different
types of consumer and trade blogs. Therefore, the researcher used the LexisNexus®
Academic database to find articles that were published during the designated timeframe,

54

and which represented a sampling from similar media types: business, public
relations/marketing, consumer blogs, and global media.
A complete listing of the media articles can be found in Appendix A (Sony
PlayStation) and Appendix B (Aflac). The researcher also reviewed each organization’s
web site, press releases, and a variety of organizational and public comments posted on
the company’s blog, Facebook page, and Twitter site during the studied crisis timeframe.
Reference Period
For the content analysis, the period of study begins with the date when a major
media outlet first noted the crisis and extends through the timeframe of significant media
coverage regarding the crisis event. In both cases, the timeframe ranged six to eight
weeks. For the Sony PlayStation case, the researcher reviewed the media texts during the
timeframe of April 20 through June 4, 2011. For the Aflac case, the researcher reviewed
media texts during the timeframe of March 14 through May 15, 2011. For the textual
analysis, the period of study in both cases also included historical records of web
postings, social media postings, and traditional media coverage of the two months
immediately prior to the crisis and the two months after the significant volume of media
coverage subsided.
Coding
Weber (1990) noted that before the coding process can begin, the researcher must
identify what will be studied, as well as the substantive questions and relevant theories to
be investigated (p. 21). Upon completion of these steps, the previously noted research
questions were separated into quantitative (content) and qualitative (textual) categories,
resulting in two coding forms for analyses (see Appendices C and D). In order to answer
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these questions, the researcher sought to identify themes or patterns across texts. For the
quantitative content analysis, the researcher reviewed the entire text of each media article
during the reference period and counted the number of times the following were
mentioned per article: (a) organization’s response time criticized, questioned, or
challenged; (b) organization’s brand perception discussed; (c) organization’s crisis
apology noted; (d) specific negative comments from key publics about the organization;
(e) specific negative comments from key publics about the organization’s executive/s;
and (f) use of social media by the organization. For the qualitative textual analysis, the
researcher reviewed the entire text of each media article during the reference period in
order to ascertain: (a) Which of Coombs’ SCCT was first adopted by the organization?;
(b) Did the organization change/move away from the initial crisis response strategy? (c)
Did the organization handle the crisis proactively or reactively?; (d) Does evidence exist
that the organization engaged in two-way communication as advocated by Grunig?; and
(e) Does evidence exist to suggest the organization handled the crisis differently in other
countries?
The presentation of the research data and findings for each ease are provided in
Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, and are organized to address the three primary research
questions:
•

RQ1: How have specific contemporary international organizations handled
crisis events?

•

RQ2: What role did emerging media play in these organizational crisis
events?
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•

RQ3 : Did these contemporary organizations demonstrate a global perspective
in handling crisis events?

Reliability and Validity
It is important to note that case study research, content analysis, and textual
analysis each has limitations. For example, textual analysis is often assumed to result in
incomplete findings (Fursich, 2009), and scientific quantitative research is preferred for
the development and testing of theoretical propositions (Cutler, 2004). However with
regard to case study research, Cutler noted:
If, for example, a researcher was interested in aspects of crisis management, he or
she could select an instance, or instances of crisis management to study in depth.
Many examples of public relations practice are defined by the issues they manage,
by the approach taken (media relations for example) or by the roles of
practitioners, and are essentially ready-made cases, (p. 368)
This research was designed to identify content themes and patterns over a specific
period of time. It did not attempt to prove a hypothesis whereby performing statistical
analysis would be required. To address reliability, the researcher employed consistent
coding practices across all analyzed media (see Appendices E & F). Macnamara (2006)
noted that validity of content analysis is achieved by thoroughly understanding the
research objectives, by conducting preliminary reading of a sub-set of relevant content,
and through a careful selection of the sample of media content to be analyzed (p. 13).
Additionally, semantic validity (Krippendorf, 1980) was addressed as the researcher’s
analysis of whole media texts considered challenges such as synonyms or words with
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multiple meanings, areas that are not easily distinguished by computer-aided analysis
(Weber, 1990, p. 21).

Chapter 4: Sony PlayStation Case Research Findings
Although this case took place a few weeks after the Aflac case, it is the more
“traditional” crisis case and is therefore being presented first. As previously noted, for
both cases, whole print and online media texts as well as specific statements within each
text were coded and analyzed in order to identify common themes or patterns.
Additionally, the organization’s external communication including press releases, the
company’s web site, and its social media presence (i.e. Facebook and Twitter sites) were
reviewed. In order to answer each of the research questions, the data were analyzed by
considering the crisis reaction and/or response from the media, general external publics,
and the organization itself. By triangulating the data, this research uncovered multiple
ways of understanding how the organizational crisis unfolded and was perceived by
various key publics. It is also important to note that today’s new digital environment
enabled both the researcher and the organization’s key publics with a means to readily
capture previous reports about the organization, which occurred prior to the studied crisis
event. Therefore, the totality of the information gathered from a variety of sources over a
specific period of time served to reveal a high level of complexity in answering the
research questions.
Utilizing “Sony PlayStation” as the search-word criteria for the LexisNexis
database search, a total of 559 articles were identified during the April 19 - June 4, 2011
timeframe. After weeding out duplications and those articles that were unrelated to the
crisis event, the researcher identified 84 articles from a total of 20 separate business,
public relations trade, and global publications to be thoroughly analyzed for this crisis
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case study research. Six of the 20 selected publications represented 82% of the articles
reviewed. See Table 4.1 and Appendix A for a list of articles from each publication.
Table 4.1: Total Sony PSN print and online articles studied by media type
Sony PlayStation
Business Media(U.S.)
The New York Times
New York Times Blog
Subtotal
PR/Tech Media
PR/Marketing Week
Maskable Blog
Subtotal
Global Media
Financial Times *
Venture Beat Blog
Miscellaneous
Subtotal
TOTAL

Total # of Articles
5
7
12
3
13
16
16
26
14
56
84

*Financial Times articles originated from various countries

Understanding the Crisis Event
Types of crises: Victim, accidental or intentional (Rla). The Sony
PlayStation® Network is a global operation, but its parent company is based in Japan. In
this crisis case, the organization and subsequent media reported that there was a breach of
the organization’s system by an outside entity. Through this security breach, the hacker
illegally infiltrated and potentially stole sensitive customer information from the Sony
PlayStation® Network (PSN), Sony’s online service for use with its PlayStation video
game consoles, as well as its entertainment service platform, Qriocity™, which connects
many of Sony’s network-enabled devices including movies and television shows (Thai
Press Reports, April 28, 2011). In the company’s blog post on April 23, 2011, the
organization acknowledged that the system was “brought down by an external intrusion”
60

__

(VentureBeat, April 23, 2011). Then in its public press release on May 1, 2011, Sony
further indicated that there was a “criminal cyber-attack on the company’s data center
located in San Diego, California.” Following the company’s lead on the “cyber-attack,”
the business, trade, and global media reported on the crisis in a similar manner. For
example, in 12 out of 13 of the studied Maskable articles, the term “hacker” or “hacker
attack” was used within the body of the story. Further, one-third of all articles reviewed
used the words “breach,” “security breach,” and “hacked” in the article’s headline.
Noting the above, according to Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication
Theory (2007), the Sony PlayStation Network (PSN) crisis case would be classified
under the “victim” cluster. However, Coombs (2006) also noted that the organization’s
history of crises may alter the initial reputational threat - moving stakeholders’
perceptions from minimal attributions of crisis responsibility to very strong attributions
of crisis responsibility (p. 169). Although throughout the crisis Sony PSN maintained its
position as “victim,” social media discourse began to reveal another side to the story especially in one blog, VentureBeat, which followed the crisis closely and reported on the
Sony PSN crisis 26 times during the six-week studied timeframe. The writers of this blog
noted that Sony’s systems had been previously compromised by a group known as
“Anonymous,” resulting in Sony suing its leader for violating the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (Takahashi, April 23, 2011). In another story, they shared how one
security expert told the United States Congress that other security experts knew that Sony
was running outdated versions of the Apache Web server software that did not have a
firewall installed (Lynley, May 5, 2011). Similarly, the Financial Times (Asia edition)
noted, “Sony should have been on its guard after Anonymous, the activist hacking
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collective, declared it a target in early April, angered by its lawsuit against a tinkerer who
modified his PlayStation games console” (Waters, April 30, 2011). The media
perception (business, trade, and global) of Sony’s poor management of the crisis situation
negatively impacted the organization’s standing as “victim.” A Financial Times article
may have summed this up best by stating, “It is too early to say whether Sony’s response
to the security breach will leave it looking more like an offender than a victim” (Soble,
April 28, 2011, para. 7). Therefore, under Coombs’ SCCT, this crisis cannot be fully
positioned in the victim cluster as social media discourse identified this organization’s
stronger attributions of crisis responsibility.
Timeliness of crisis response (Rlc). According to the organization’s public
statements including an April 23ld blog post from its company spokesperson, upon
receiving evidence that an unauthorized intrusion occurred on April 20th, Sony
immediately shut down its PlayStation network (VentureBeat, April 23, 2011). However,
as VentureBeat noted, the April 23rd post was the first time that Sony PSN notified its 77
million “frustrated” users about the reason for the shutdown of the system. As well, it
took another four days before the company made an announcement regarding the
potential data breach (Menn and Palmer, Financial Times, Asia, April 28, 2011).
Overall, Sony was criticized for not responding quickly to this particular crisis
event. Of the studied media articles, 41% specifically challenged or criticized Sony’s
response time. Yet the company’s chief executive officer “argued that Sony had
responded to the attack in a timely manner and regularly shared information with
customers” (Bilton, New York Times Blogs, May 17, 2011). Originally, the crisis
appeared to be the organization’s ability to simply get the system back online. A week
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later, the crisis sparked a media discussion regarding the data breach with headlines such
as, “What Sony does next is critical to its future in games” (Takahashi, VentureBeat,
April 30, 2011) and “Sony loses face over theft of PS3 data” (Financial Times, Asia,
April 28, 2011). In the latter article (Soble, 2011), it was noted how PSN users had
vented on the company’s blog forum:
One gamer called GrandpaHomer reported his e-mail account, linked to his
PlayStation account, had been taken over by hackers on Monday, a day before
Sony’s announcement, and used to send out spam e-mails. ‘Only Sony is to be
blamed for holding this info back that long,’ he wrote, (para. 21)
By May 4th, the Financial Times (2011) questioned, “Is Sony right to take its time to
reveal security breaches?” In this article, three communication experts were posed this
question and their responses ranged from “time is no longer a company’s friend” to “my
hunch is that this will do Sony little long-term damage, provided it offers some free
content and services to users who have been disrupted.” Similarly, PRWeek (Luker, May
6, 2011) quoted an Edelman global vice-chairman as saying, “In the age of instant
comms, there isn’t the space to act and communicate separately.” Yet he also noted,
“This is always challenging, particularly for some cultures - like Japan’s - where what
you do is seen as more important than what you say. However, in the 7/24 global
environment, they can amount to the same thing” (para. 5 & 6).
Since the crisis event originated in the United States, Sony’s slow response time
received a stem reaction from yet another key public: the United States government. On
April 27th, The New York Times noted that Connecticut Senator Richard Blumenthal had
cited concerns that many PlayStation users are children and he wanted to know why Sony
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had not notified its customers immediately about the security breach. The Financial
Times went further quoting Blumenthal as saying, “I am absolutely appalled. The facts
show that Sony purposefully deceived people and misled them before. It has now finally
begun coming clean” (April 28, para. 5). Then in a follow-up article, “Sony chief defends
response to PlayStation data breach” (The New York Times Blogs, May 17, 2011), it was
noted that Sony’s slow response had prompted the United States’ House subcommittee on
Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade to call for hearings and to introduce new data and
security legislation to better protect consumers’ online data. At first, Sony declined to
attend the subcommittee hearings stating that it was currently involved in its own
“ongoing intensive investigation” {New York Times Blogs, May 28, 2011). By end of
May, though, New York Times ’blogger Nick Bilton noted that the company had finally
agreed to testify. He added, “Since the huge cyber attack on the PlayStation Network,
Sony has become the poster child for data and security reform in Congress” (May 28,
2011, para. 8).
Types of crisis response: Deny, diminish, inform or rebuild (Rid and Rle).
As previously noted, the SCCT offers four crisis response strategies - deny, diminish,
inform, or rebuild - and the theory argues that the crisis manager needs to select the
strategy that best serves to protect the organization. In fact, Coombs’ SCCT (2006) is
“premised on matching the crisis response strategy to the demands of the crisis situation”
(p. 255). Coombs further divided these four strategies into categories. For instance, the
deny strategy has three possible categories - attack the accuser, denial (assertion that
there is no crisis), or scapegoat. Scapegoat is when the crisis manager blames some
person or outside group for the crisis (Coombs, 2007). Under the diminish strategy, the
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organization can “excuse” itself by minimizing its responsibility by either denying intent
to do harm or by claiming that events which triggered the crisis were out of the
organization’s control. Coombs did not separate the inform strategy into separate
categories.
Coombs noted that most stakeholders leam about a crisis from news media and,
indeed, how news media “frame” the crisis can determine the required crisis response
strategy (2007, p. 173). Accordingly, the researcher attempted to break out specific
articles that reflected news reporting on Sony’s position/communication as it pertained to
one of the four potential SCCT crisis response strategies. Table 4.2 provides a summary
of how the news media framed the organization’s portrayal of this crisis event; however,
56% of the articles studied either reported solely on facts or offered commentary from
other key publics. Therefore, these articles were not counted for this part of the analysis.
Table 4.2: Identified SCCT Crisis Response Strategies Used by Sony PSN
S C C T Strategy A pplied

Total # o f m edia articles
denoting com pany strategy

% o f m edia articles
denoting com pany strategy

Deny/Scapegoat

23

27%

Diminish

0

0

Inform

11

13%

Rebuild/Compensation or
Bolstering

6

7%

Under the SCCT, Sony’s initial crisis response strategy fell under the
deny/scapegoat category. At first, Sony PSN failed to acknowledge that a crisis occurred
by simply calling it a “service outage” on their April 21st blog posting. In this posting,
the spokesperson noted that it could take a few days to restore service while they
investigated the cause of the Network outage (Takahashi, VentureBeat, April 21, 2011).
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This resulted in VentureBeat’s speculation for the outage, questioning if the prior day’s
PSN service update “was the cause of the crash.” Even more noteworthy is that no other
mainstream media outlet reported on the issue until April 23rd, when the company first
announced the reason for the outage, blaming an outside entity (scapegoat strategy) for an
“external intrusion on our system” (Takahashi, VentureBeat, April 23, 2011). In fact, of
the media studied, most posted their first article on the crisis event as late as April 27th.
These post-crisis media reports were triggered by an April 26th blog posting from Sony
PSN’s spokesperson, which stated that the outage was the result of an attack whereby an
“unauthorized person has obtained personal information about the account holders, and
may have comprised confidential information such as credit card numbers” (The New
York Times, April 27, 2011).
As the crisis unfolded and the above-mentioned additional challenges came to
light, the company continued to alternate its crisis response strategy from deny/scapegoat
to inform and then to rebuild. In its efforts to keep key publics informed about the outage
and when service would be restored, Sony PSN utilized the company’s web site, five
press releases, and various social media outlets (especially its company blog). During
the studied timeframe, each of the company-issued press releases triggered additional
commentary from the media (over 63% of the articles studied were published after May
5th). The five issued press releases were as follows:
1)

May 1, 2011 - Some PlayStation® Network and Qriocity™ Services to be

available this week; Phased rollout of services to begin regionally; system security
enhanced to provide greater protection of personal information.
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2) May 14, 2011 - Restoration of PlayStation® Network and Qriocity™ services
begins
3) May 27, 2011 - Phase restoration of PlayStation®Network and Qriocity™
services also begins in Japan and Asian countries and regions
4) May 31, 2011 - Sony and Sony Computer Entertainment announce full
restoration of PlayStation® Network services; Full PlayStation® Network Services
Restored; Music Unlimited Powered by Qriocity™ to Become Available on
PlayStation®3, PSP® (PlayStation®Portable), VAIO and other PCs
5) June 2, 2011 - Full restoration of PlayStation Network services begins today;
full PlayStation Network services restored.
From mid-May through early June, the organization utilized the same
communication resources as it began to apply its rebuild strategy, an “attempt to improve
the organization’s reputation by offering material and/or symbolic forms of aid to
victims” (Coombs, 2007, p. 172). For instance, Sony launched a YouTube video (Sony
PlayStation, 2011) from its chief executive, to first inform about “greatly-updated”
security measures that the organization has put into place and, next, to rebuild by
promoting its “Welcome Back” package (which included free games and movie rentals,
and free identity-theft protection for its customers). Additionally, the executive
expressed that Sony PSN “will do everything we can to regain your trust and
confidence.” Yet while Howard Stringer, the chief executive, apologized to Sony’s
customers (gamers) for the PSN outage, he also applied a rebuild/bolstering strategy by
reminding stakeholders that the organization is a victim of the crisis too (Coombs, 2007,
p. 270):
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I wish we could have gotten the answers we need sooner, but forensic analysis is a
complex, time-consuming process. Hackers, after all, do their best to cover their
tracks, and it took some time for our experts to find those tracks and begin to
identify what personal information had or ‘had not’ been taken ... we are facing a
very man-made event, a criminal attack on us, and on you. (VentureBeat, May 5,
2011)

It should be noted that Coombs’ SCCT advocates for crisis managers to maintain
consistency in crisis response strategies, further noting that by mixing certain strategies
the organization will “erode the effectiveness of the overall response” (2007, p. 173). An
analysis of whether Sony PSN utilized the best or proper mix of crisis responses, per
what has been represented in Table 2 will be discussed in Chapter 6.
Proactive versus reactive crisis response (Rif)- Overall, this crisis was
managed reactively. The company shut down the PSN for five full days with little
explanation for the “service outage” that halted customer access to online games,
customer accounts, movie purchases, and other entertainment offered on the network
(Takahashi, VentureBeat, May 4, 2011). Within two days, VentureBeat (May 4, 2011)
noted that the company did inform the FBI, and it engaged outside security consultants to
assist with the investigation; but it was not until April 26th that it informed the news
media, its customers, and a variety of states’ regulatory authorities about the “criminal
intrusion.” A detailed six-week timeline (see Figure 4.1) highlights Sony’s reactive
response style as the crisis unfolded. It also outlines the number of media articles that
were triggered by each of Sony’s formal communication notifications.
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Figure 4.1: Sony PlayStation Crisis Timeline

Understanding the Role of Social Media
Organization’s online presence prior to the crisis (R2a). Sony PlayStation
had/has a very robust presence on the Internet and in social media. In the United States,
the company has a web site - http://us.playstation.com/psn/ and a company blog:
http://blog.us.plavstation.com/category/psn/. The same is true for Europe:
http://blog.eu.playstation.com/. All country/regional sites (over 40 in total) can be found
at: http://uk.playstation.com/countiT-selector/. The organization also has separate
Facebook fan pages and Twitter sites. (For example, in the United States:
http://www.facebook.com/PlavStation and http://twitter.com/Playstation; in Europe:
http://www.facebook.com/SonvPlaystation and https://twitter.com/PlayStationEU.) The
company also has a presence on YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/sonyplaystation.
Social media’s role in the crisis (Rib and R2b). The organization’s public
statements (i.e. blog postings and press releases) as well as the studied media articles
acknowledged that this crisis was a result of an outside entity illegally infiltrating and
stealing sensitive customer information from Sony’s PSN. Although the crisis was
subsequently discussed on social media, it did not originate there.
Sony PlayStation had/has an active blog universe and the organization did post
about its “network outage” on April 21st, one day after the PSN service was shutdown.
However, the company did not reveal the cause of the outage or the potential data breach
until several days later. Of the media articles studied, 14% referenced the company’s use
of social media, especially its blog, as being used by the organization to post crisis
updates. Yet aside from the blog forum, this research found no evidence of the
organization’s use of social media to proactively inform key publics during the first two
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weeks of the outage. In fact, from April 19th (the day before the crisis hit) until May 6th
there were no postings from the company on its Sony PlayStation Facebook page. The
New York Times (April 27, 2011) noted that one social media expert from Sweden and
the father of a six-year-old Sony PSN user said, “Sony is pretty much doing everything
wrong.” He then added about his daughter, “She doesn’t have any direct purchasing
power, but her direct influence in what my wife and I buy is enormous ... Sony is losing
the battle over her” (para. 8 & 9).
As it moved to rebuild its brand image by mid-May, the company did post a
detailed five minute YouTube video (Sony PlayStation, 2011) from its president and
group chief executive officer, Kazuo Hirai (refer to Rle for more information). However
one public relations expert in crisis communication noted that organizations such as Sony
need to recognize the importance of acting more quickly in order to earn the public’s
trust: “Sony is now doing this through sites, blogs and Twitter feeds - but its users may
see this as too little, too late” (PRWeek, May 6, 2011, para. 4).
Comments regarding the organization’s leadership (R2e). In 7% of the
articles reviewed, the company’s leadership was negatively discussed or referenced.
Although a relatively small percentage, it is noteworthy as 46% of the articles reviewed
were neutral in tone (no strong bias/comments one way or another). In fact, when
reviewing only the articles with a negative tone (i.e., includes negative headline or
negative comments made by reporter or customers), 13% specifically mentioned the
organization’s CEO, Howard Stringer, or other senior leadership (e.g. Kazuo Hirai) in a
negative manner. One example of this was featured in the headline of the Daily
Telegraph, “Pressure to quit builds on Sony's Stringer” (Ruddick, May, 2011). Still,
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other global media reported that the leaders, including presumed successor Hirai, had
bowed deeply (a Japanese cultural expression of sincere apology) when they apologized
for the security breach (O’Grady, Business Day/South Africa, May 4, 2011 and Ruddick,
The Daily Telegraph, May 4, 2011). It should be noted that beyond the specific
timeframe studied, there were additional calls for Sony’s then CEO (Stringer) to step
down; and it has been recently reported that he will step down in April, 2012 (Benedetti,
2011 and Waugh, 2012).
Although this research found no specific mention of the CEO or the company’s
senior leadership being discussed by gamers on social media, there were occasional
mentions pertaining to Sony’s “staff.” For example, on Facebook:
•

Viki Govier, May 31: “You guys at Sony said in earlier blogs that we would have
full service by end of May and today it is that day and you let us down again by
saying it will be up by the end of the week what day is that cause I’m sick of
being let down by you now;” and

•

George Jones, June 2: “I paid for PS plus and since the first month it’s been
appalling. Do not buy it. Read this before Sony remove my comment like they did
the last 6 times...”
Considering that the general public is less likely to know the CEO’s name or the

names of a company’s senior staff, it is not surprising to find common language usage
such as “you guys” or the brand name to collectively reflect the organization’s leadership.
However, in this case any specific negative leadership references by the public via social
media were generally as infrequent as those by the print and online media.
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Comments regarding the organization’s brand (R2f). Although it could be
argued that every crisis-related article has the potential to negatively affect an
organization’s brand (87% of studied articles mentioned the Sony or PlayStation Network
brand name in the headline), the Sony brand was specifically referenced in 40% of the
articles reviewed (see Table 4.3). However, most of the media commentary either
questioned how the organization’s brand will rebound after the crisis or discussed how
the organization was attempting to salvage its brand reputation by offering free games to
its PlayStation Network users (Lynley, VentureBeat, May 16, 2011) and a one year, $1
million identity-theft insurance policy to U.S. gamers who were impacted by the breach
(Best Wire, May 11, 2011). Additionally, approximately 17% of the articles studied
specifically noted the company’s apology for the service outage, but only a small
percentage of these articles (14%) questioned the sincerity of the company’s apology.
Table 4.3: Media Coverage of Sony PSN Crisis (April 19 - June 3, 2011)
% Referenced Brand in
Headline
87%

% Referenced Brand
Reputation or Financial
Impact within Article
40%

% Noted Company’s
Apology
17%

Table 4.4 identifies the percentage of articles coded by the researcher as
“negative” versus “neutral” (Note: No articles were coded as “positive” as none of the
studied articles praised Sony’s handling of this crisis event). This table also captures the
percentage of articles, per media type, that negatively reviewed the company’s CEO or
executive spokesperson. Of note, the public relations/marketing trade publications were
much more critical of Sony’s handling of this crisis, with 63% of the articles reviewed in
this category coded as “negative” in overall tone. Yet none of these articles negatively
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commented on the organization’s leadership. Rather, the public relations trades were
more focused on the poor communication process (e.g. response time).
Table 4.4: Media coverage of Sony PSN crisis by media type (April 19 - June 3,
2011)

Type of Media

T o ta l A r tic le s

P ercent

P er ce n t

P e r c e n t N eg a tiv e ly

R ev ie w ed

N e g a tiv e T o n e

N e u tr a l T o n e

R e v ie w C o m p a n y
S p o k esp er so n

Business Media (U.S.)

12

50%

50%

25%

PR/Tech Media

16

63%

37%

0%

Global Media

56

50%

50%

25%

TOTAL

84

52%

48%

7%

On social media, however, Sony PSN users (a key public) often blasted the
company with disparaging remarks, even threatening to go to a Sony PSN competitor.
Overall customer sentiment expressed frustration with the length of the outage and the
perception of unmet promises by Sony to restore service on a given day. The following
are sample excerpts from Sony PlayStation’s Facebook page:
•

Peter Hider, May 29: “It’s back online bout f**ing time next time how bout some
wamin seriously thinkin about going 2 xbox;”

•

Mark Taylor, May 31: “Outstanding, try to play psp online says need to change
password and come on to get message saying store closed after all the downtime
psn has had already. Xbox for the win;” and

•

Steve Grimwood, May 31: “Losing faith in Sony, this is really soul destroying.”

By May 7th, VentureBeat (Takahashi) reported that Sony shares had fallen more
than 6 percent —just two weeks after the crisis. Additionally, a PRWeek “Reputation
Survey” released on May 13th (Magee, 2011) indicated that most customers believed the
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crisis had harmed Sony’s reputation yet 62% who owned a PlayStation said they would
not consider switching to a competitor. Still, one brand expert predicted the brand would
“bounce back” as “Sony is an exceptionally strong brand with a long-established
reputation for reliability, innovation and good design” {Financial Times - London, May
4, 2011). Chapter 6 discusses the crisis event’s overall impact to the Sony PlayStation
brand, including an update on where the brand stands one year later.
Post-crisis event online communications practices (R2g). As noted, the
organization had actively engaged in social media prior to this crisis event. There is
some evidence to suggest that Sony PlayStation began to utilize its online vehicles more
frequently (i.e. postings on its blog and Facebook fan page); however, it is not evident
whether this outcome is a direct result of this crisis event or merely a factor of continued
increasing prominence of social media usage by all publics.
Use of two-way communication with key publics (R2c and R2d): For the
studied timeframe, this research found no evidence of two-way symmetrical
communication between the organization and its key publics, including its social media
usage. Rather, there is evidence that in some cases the organization chose to defer
communications with the United States Congress (The New York Times Blog, May 17,
2011) and with key bloggers such as those of VentureBeat who indicated that Sony did
not respond to its inquiries regarding allegations for the service outage (Lynley, April 26,
2011). As for how the organization communicated directly with its customers, it has
been previously noted that there was no social media communication for a two-week
period, and subsequent communications were sporadic. In one Facebook posting on May
29, a frustrated customer (Marvin Lee James) anxiously awaited any type of
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communication from Sony: “Networks down AGAIN but to make it worse no news on
the blog or anything about it!! You think this is the way to treat your loyal customers?
...You’re a joke! I’m selling my PS to the first mug who wants it and I’m going to Xbox.”
Understanding the Global Perspective
Organization’s global crisis approach: Ethnocentric, polycentric, hybrid
approaches (R3a and R3b). In a review of the organization’s web site, Facebook page,
and blog, there is no clear evidence that Sony, a Japanese organization, managed or
communicated about this issue any differently in other countries. Therefore, the company
predominantly applied an ethnocentric approach to its crisis communication. Certainly in
its press releases, the organization acknowledged that it had global customers, and, to the
extent that the service outage impacted these global customers, Sony did inform its
customers from various countries when their service would be restored (May 1 press
release referred to a “phased global rollout of services”). By May 27th, Sony announced a
partial restoration of its PSN and Qriocity services for all countries/regions, and by June
2nd it had issued a follow-up press release announcing the full restoration of its services in
the Americas, Europe/PAL territories, and Asia (excluding Japan, Hong Kong, and South
Korea). Although the service outage first took place in the United States, the company
provided no explanation as to the how or why it selected certain countries to restore
services to before others. In the latter press release, the company simply noted that
restoration announcements for the remaining countries would be made “as they become
available.”
Conversely, a review of print and online media publications showed that the
media’s style or frequency of reporting differed across domestic and global types. For
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example, during the studied timeframe, the Financial Times reported on this event three
times more than The New York Times, even though the crisis event occurred in the United
States. Further, the Financial Times were more critical of the company’s handling of the
crisis. A simple comparative analysis of headlines reveals some of this overall tone as
the New York Times used action terms such as “defends” and “asks” while the Financial
Times used “loses face,” “faces fire,” and “point finger” in its headlines. Interestingly,
however, neither of these prominent media reported on Sony PSN’s efforts to rebuild
favor with its customers by offering a “Welcome Back” package or by offering identity
theft protection.
Summary of Findings
Whether or not Sony could have fully protected itself from this particular crisis
event remains unknown. Certainly organizations and governments are vulnerable to
hacking or cyber attacks even when the best security measures are in place. However,
recognizing that Sony was previously a target of a specific hacker group, there were
expectations that Sony should have utilized the most advanced security measures
available, yet it was revealed by various media sources that it did not.
From a communication standpoint, Sony’s leadership and public relations staff
did not adhere to many research-based best practices in crisis management. In fact, this
research found:
•

Sony’s key publics lost faith and patience with the company’s slow
response time;

•

Over 50% of the studied media articles reflected negatively on the
company’s management of the crisis event;
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•

There is no evidence of two-way symmetrical communications between
the organization and its key publics; and

•

The crisis appears to have been managed in the same manner (ethnocentric
approach) for all affected global publics.

Furthermore, with regard to Coombs’ Situational Crisis Communication Theory
(SCCT), there is little evidence that Sony PlayStation applied the appropriate SCCT’s
strategies to manage this security breach. Rather, there is more evidence to support that
Sony reacted to individual events as they unfolded and never anticipated a service outage
that would last for several weeks. To that end, Sony’s reactive and often silent
communication style enabled other key publics to frame the crisis situation, creating
doubt for the company’s primary position as “victim.”
Finally, although this crisis event was not the result of an issue that arose in social
media discourse, the organization’s utilization of social media to keep key publics
informed was haphazard or limited at best. As noted in the literature review, all online
comments are archived and discoverable. The details surrounding this crisis event will
likely haunt the Sony PlayStation brand for many years to come.
Now for comparative purposes, a second crisis case (which took place during a
similar timeframe) is reviewed in Chapter 5.
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Chapter 5: Aflac Case Research Findings
The Aflac crisis case differs from the Sony PlayStation case in two significant
ways. First, this crisis event was the result of one person’s postings on Twitter; thus this
issue was incited by social media. Second, as will be revealed in the upcoming findings,
the organization’s handling of this event is quite different - from its response time to the
company’s use of social media to manage the crisis event. However, there is one
coincidental but hardly irrelevant similarity between these two cases: For both
organizations, Japan is a critical factor in terms of revenue and culture.
By employing the same methodology as the previous case study, the Aflac data
was similarly collected and analyzed by considering the crisis reaction and/or response
from the print and online media, from general external publics (via social media) and
from the organization itself. Once again, this research’s triangulated data revealed
multiple ways of understanding how the organizational crisis unfolded and was perceived
by various key publics.
In order to secure a variety of print and online articles that covered this crisis
event, the term “Aflac” was utilized as the search word criteria for the LexisNexis
database search during the March 14 - May 15, 2011 timeframe. After weeding out
duplications and those articles that were unrelated to the crisis event, and in an attempt to
have a comparative number of total studied articles for both cases, the researcher
identified 85 articles to be thoroughly analyzed for this crisis case study research. These
articles represent 14 separate business, public relations’ trade, and global publications, as
well as 37 different consumer blogs. It should be noted that there was minimal coverage
of this crisis event from major print media (e.g. Financial Times), yet the blogosphere
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was an ample source for commentary. See Table 5.1 and Appendix B for a list of articles
from each publication.
Table 5.1 - Total Aflac print and online articles studied by media type
Aflac Media

Total Number of
Articles Reviewed

Business Media(U.S.)
11

The N ew York Times

PR/Tech Media
3
6

A dF reak B log
M askable B log

Subtotal
Consumer Media
Miscellaneous Blogs
Global Media
Miscellaneous
TOTAL

9
49

'
16
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Understanding the Crisis Event
Types of crises: Victim, accidental or intentional (Rla). On Friday, March 11,
2011, Japan suffered a powerful and destructive earthquake and tsunami (Diep, 2011).
Within 24 hours, comedian Gilbert Gottfried (also the voice of Aflac’s brand icon, the
Aflac duck since 2000), posted jokes on his personal Twitter account (@RealGilbert) that
Aflac, his employer, and many in the print and online media deemed to be insensitive
comments about the Japan disaster. The following are some examples of Gottfried’s
tweets from March 12, 2011 {International Business Times, March 15, 2011):
•

“I just split up with my girlfriend, but like the Japanese say, ‘there will be another
one floating by any minute now’ and

•

“Japan is really advanced. They don’t go to the beach. The beach comes to
them.”

By Monday, March 14th, the well-known insurance giant with 75% of its revenue
coming from the Japanese market, announced that it had fired Gottfried for his comments
(Elliott, The New York Times, March 15, 2011). According to Coombs’ Situational Crisis
Communication Theory (2007), the Aflac/Gottfried crisis case might have been classified
under the “victim” cluster because the organization could be represented as a victim of
the crisis as an external agent caused damage (malevolence) to the organization (p. 168).
However, Gottfried is a paid contractor, not an external agent, and there is no evidence to
suggest that Gottfried intended any malice or damage to Aflac or its brand. Rather, the
media and other well-known comedians indicated that Gottfried, who had partnered with
Aflac for over a decade (Guelph Mercury, March 16, 2011), had a history of making
insensitive jokes, including after such disasters as September 11th. Comedian Howard
Stern commented, “When the Aflac people hired him to be the Aflac duck, they knew ...
this is an offensive guy, this is a guy whose humour is offensive. He’s made fun of every
disaster I’ve ever heard o f’ {The Calgary Herald, March 18, 2011). Some members of
the media agreed:
If Aflac, which is a top foreign insurance company in Japan and which gets 75%
of its revenue from that market, was concerned about courtesy in public
communication, it probably should not have hired Gottfried as a spokesperson in
the first place. (O’Dell, Mashable, March 15, 2011)
Certainly, Twitter and other prominent social media did not exist during the
September 11thtragedy; therefore Gottfried’s jokes at that time were likely shared with
limited audiences. And in this case, Gottfried, who is not the voice of the duck in Japan
{Daily the Pak Banker, March 16, 2011), did publicly apologize for his tweets
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{International Business Times News, March 16, 2011). Therefore, with evidence of
previous history yet no evidence of intentional malice to the organization, this particular
social media crisis event does not readily fit into any existing crisis cluster category as
outlined in Coombs’ SCCT.
Timeliness of crisis response (Rlc). Both the organization and the media
reported on Aflac’s immediate response to Gottfried’s “insensitive tweets,” and several
members of the print and online media praised the company’s swift response.
Additionally, the Chairwoman and Chief Executive Public Relation Society of America
New York, commended Aflac for its “expedient and decisive measures” (Fiske, The New
York Times, March 24, 2011).
In a post-crisis video interview with Forbes (Noer, 2011), Aflac’s chief marketing
officer (CMO), Michael Zuna explained how Aflac immediately reacted to a public
relations crisis event and utilized social media to the company’s advantage (June 6,
2011). In this interview, Zuna noted how the company’s head of corporate
communications had brought the tweets to his attention and that they “immediately said
‘boy we have a problem here.’” Zuna further noted that he then called the company’s
president and chairman with a recommendation that the company needed to fire
Gottfried, and, according to Zuna, both leaders agreed with this decision. He then
contacted Gottfried’s agent while the corporate communications office prepared and
issued a press release announcing the firing of Gilbert. He concluded that from the time
he was informed about the tweets to the time the company acted upon it was under an
hour. The Forbes interviewer, Michael Noer, who noted how the Aflac duck is one of
the most iconic brand images in America, commented, “It’s a good lesson, I think, for
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crisis management, in terms of PR ...you can’t let these things sit on somebody’s desk
for hours, you have to really go on them right away” (Noer, 2011). Zuna responded by
stating that the company wanted to act swiftly in order to “control the situation and the
news in the manner we felt best represented our brand and our company” (Noer, 2011),
Types of crisis response: Inform, deny, diminish, or rebuild (Rid and Rle).
In evaluating Aflac crisis response strategy, particularly with regard to Coombs’ SCCT,
there are some important points for consideration. For one, although today’s viral
environment might predict that an activist organization would have been offended by
Gottfried’s tweets, not every negative tweet is destined to become a crisis. Still, Aflac
chose to get ahead of any potential negative media and, by doing so through its own press
release, the company itself reported or informed the media and other publics about the
crisis event (Rose, The Adaptive Marketer, March 16, 2011). Under Coombs’ SCCT, the
inform strategy should be used to alert key publics that a crisis has occurred and to keep
these publics up-to-date on the company’s management of the crisis. Even though the
company made the decision that a crisis had indeed occurred, it never truly declared the
company as the “victim”; rather, it said the victims were the people of Japan. The
following statement was provided to the media by Aflac’s CMO Michael Zuna:
Gilbert’s recent comments about the crisis in Japan were lacking in humor and
certainly do not represent the thoughts and feelings of anyone at Aflac. Aflac
Japan - and by extension, Japan itself - is a part of the Aflac family, and there is
no place for anything but compassion and concern during these difficult times.
{International Business Times News, March 16, 2011)
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Aflac did inform the media that Gottfried, a paid contractor who therefore cannot
be legitimately deemed an external agent, had posted tweets that were ‘‘lacking in
humor” (International Business Times News, March 15, 2011). Per the SCCT, the
company’s explanation of this crisis certainly places blame on Gottfried; but, since he is
not “outside the organization,” the deny/scapegoat strategy does not apply. Further,
although Aflac indirectly apologized for his tweets, it did not accept full responsibility for
the crisis, and the CEO said that the company did accept Gottfried’s formal apology
(Hoffman, Wall St. Cheat Sheet, March 31, 2011). Therefore, the crisis strategy adopted
cannot be classified as deny/apology. In evaluating the diminish/excuse strategy, the
“crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying intent to do harm
and/or claiming inability to control the events that triggered the crisis” (Coombs, 2006, p.
248). There is no strong evidence to support that the company claimed an inability to
control the events —although it did note and invoke a “morals clause” in Gottfried’s
contract (Say Anything, March 16, 2011). Therefore, the SCCT strategy chosen by Aflac
most closely followed a bolstering strategy whereby the organization drew sympathy for
stakeholders who are the victim of the crisis while striving to generate new “reputational
assets” (Coombs, 2007, p. 172). In fact, the company’s first press release on this issue,
“Aflac Severs Ties with Gilbert Gottfried,” unveiled its rebuild/bolstering strategy:
Aflac will immediately set plans in motion to conduct a nationwide casting call to
find a new voice of the iconic Aflac Duck. It should be noted that Gilbert
Gottfried is not the voice of the Aflac Duck in Japan. Last week Aflac announced
that the company was donating 100 million yen to the International Red Cross for
disaster assistance. (March 14, 2011)
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The company continued with its bolstering strategy by taking the “new voice of
the duck” campaign to Facebook and Twitter, and by issuing three additional press
releases:

1) March 24, 2011 - A New Voice to Give the Aflac Duck its Quack Back;
2) March 31, 2011 - Final Call for Aflac Duck Voice Online Auditions; and
3) April 26, 2011 - Aflac Duck Gets Its Quack Back!
Using Coombs’ SCCT, Table 5.2 provides a summary of how the media framed
the organization’s portrayal of this crisis event during the studied timeframe. It is
important to note that 24% (*) of the studied articles reported on both the firing (inform)
and the nationwide casting call {bolster). Another 20% were not categorized as these
were more focused on the challenges of social media, the company’s next steps, or
speculation about Gottfried.
Table 5.2: Identified SCCT Crisis Response Strategies Used by Aflac
S C C T Strategy A pplied

# o f m edia articles which
denote com pany strategy

% o f m edia articles which
denote com pany strategy

Deny/Scapegoat

0

0%

Diminish

0

0%

Inform

49*

56%

Rebuild/Compensation or
Bolstering

38*

44%

Proactive versus reactive crisis response (Rif). The Aflac crisis was managed
by the organization in a highly proactive manner. As previously noted, Aflac chose to
“get ahead” of the Gottfried tweets by responding before any other key publics had a
chance to do so. The company then engaged in a proactive marketing campaign to search
for a new voice of their iconic duck.
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As Aflac’s CMO noted in his video interview with Forbes (Noer, 2011), companies
facing a crisis “need to act swiftly and almost with shock and awe. Make a decision and
stand by it.” Zuna further offered the following advice: “Don’t forget you are in control
of the situation and your brand at that point in time, and you have the opportunity to
control the crisis in a manner that you think best represents the brand.” In a detailed
nine-week timeline (see Figure 5.1), Aflac’s proactive management of this crisis event is
fully noted. It also outlines the number of media articles that were triggered by each of
Aflac’s formal communication notifications.
Understanding the Role of Social Media
Organization’s online presence prior to the crisis (R2a). Aflac had/has a very
robust presence on the Internet and in social media. The company has a global web site:
www.aflac.com. On its web site, the organization prominently features its “social media”
section (http://www.aflac.com/aboutaflac/social media/social media.aspx) in order to let
site visitors know how to engage with the Aflac duck via Facebook or Twitter:
www.facebook.com/aflacduck and www.twitter.com/aflacduck. At the time of the crisis,
the Aflac duck had 236,000 fans (Nudd, Adfreak, March 23, 2011). The company also
reports on its web site that Aflac’s President uses Twitter www.twitter.com/pamos 19 to
“offer his perspectives on leadership, life and insurance, and engage in conversations
with the people that make Aflac one of the world’s most ethical companies.”
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As Aflac’s CMO noted in his video interview with Forbes (Noer, 2011), companies
facing a crisis “need to act swiftly and almost with shock and awe. Make a decision and
stand by it.” Zuna further offered the following advice: “Don’t forget you are in control
of the situation and your brand at that point in time, and you have the opportunity to
control the crisis in a manner that you think best represents the brand.” In a detailed
nine-week timeline (see Figure 5.1), Aflac’s proactive management of this crisis event is
fully noted. It also outlines the number of media articles that were triggered by each of
Aflac’s formal communication notifications.
Understanding the Role of Social Media
Organization’s online presence prior to the crisis (R2a). Aflac had/has a very
robust presence on the Internet and in social media. The company has a global web site:
www.aflac.com. On its web site, the organization prominently features its “social media”
section (http://www.aflac.com/aboutaflac/social media/social media.aspx) in order to let
site visitors know how to engage with the Aflac duck via Facebook or Twitter:
WWW.

facebook.com/aflacduck and www.twitter.com/aflacduck. At the time of the crisis,

the Aflac duck had 236,000 fans (Nudd, Adfreak, March 23, 2011). The company also
reports on its web site that Aflac’s President uses Twitter www.twitter.com/pamos 19 to
“offer his perspectives on leadership, life and insurance, and engage in conversations
with the people that make Aflac one of the world’s most ethical companies.”
Social media’s role in the crisis (Rib and R2b). As previously noted, this crisis
was initiated by Gottfried’s tweets about the March 2011 Japan earthquake and tsunami.
Although the crisis originated on social media, in many ways social media played an
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Figure 5.1: Aflac Crisis Timeline

Gottfried, Aflac’s CMO noted that he came home to several messages from people
offering their services as the new duck. He then realized that the company had a “really
unique opportunity,” so he gathered key members from his marketing staff and the
company’s agencies to “take advantage of America’s talent with the phenomenon of
reality TV and reality shows and see ‘could we do the same?’ ... to turn this into a
positive for us” (Zuna as quoted in Noer, 2011). As an aside, this recollection of events
seems to be in conflict with his previously noted comment that “from the time he was
informed about the tweets to the time the company acted upon it was under an hour.”
After all, the first press release issued by Aflac announcing Gottfried’s firing noted the
company would “immediately set plans in motion to conduct a nationwide casting call to
find a new voice of the iconic Aflac duck.” If this press release went out before Zuna
came home that evening to hear these messages, it is unclear how this impromptu late
night vision was possible. Otherwise, the press release must have been issued the next
day, and not within an hour.
Aflac’s subsequent nationwide talent search was conducted through Facebook,
Twitter, and the career web site, Monster.com. The company utilized an old television
commercial featuring the duck and did a take-off on silent movies and used it as a
platform for its campaign.
This was a real job ... we were very focused on taking advantage of a situation to
do this in a very modern and innovative way yet at the same time, we were very
concerned about getting back into market as soon as possible. Where better to use
the internet to do that and get your message out with scale? (Zuna as quoted in
Noer, 2011)
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Interestingly, the Aflac duck never mentioned Gottfried by name on its Twitter posts perhaps because Twitter was the source of the crisis. Here are some examples of the
Facebook and/or Twitter comments posted by Aflac’s duck during the crisis event:
•

Facebook, May 9, 2011 - “I’ve been so busy with finding a new voice that I
haven’t seen my friends. Will you post pics of my duck friends you see?” (74
people “liked this”);

•

Facebook, April 6, 2011 - “The search for a new duck voice has kept me
busy, but the situation in Japan is still weighing heavy on my mind. If you
haven’t already done so, please consider making a donation to the Red Cross
disaster relief fund” (121 people “liked this”);

•

Facebook, April 2, 2011 - “Holy feathers, Batman - over 11,000 of you
submitted applications to be my new voice! It’s going to be a long weekend
reviewing applications, but it’s worth it. I’m dying to get my voice back.”
(286 people “liked this”);

•

Twitter, March 24, 2011 - “I’ve got millions of thoughts but only one voice to
give out. Could you be my new voice? Find out how to apply at
http://aflac.com/monster:”

•

Twitter, March 15, 2011 —“Love that you want to be my new voice. But first
I’m using it to ask for donations to the Red Cross for Japan.
www.redcross.org/donate:” and

•

Facebook, March 15, 2011 - “Gilbert Gottffried’s insensitive comments about
the tragedy in Japan have left me speechless but not for long.” Linked to first
company press release. (341 people “liked this” and 195 posted comments).
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With regard to the posting above, the 195 comments reflected a mixed sentiment
on Aflac’s decision. Some responses included:
•

Brian Beroldi, March 26, 2011 - “Please boycott Aflac for violating the first
amendment;”

•

Patrick Bryant, March 27, 2011 - “BRING BACK Gilbert Gottfried!!!! THE
DUCK WILL FAIL WITHOUT;” and

•

Keacha Bradley, April 1, 2011 - “I say good job. Japan is a major market for
Aflac. It was heartless and uncalled for. People can say what they want, but it
doesn’t make it right or funny.”

Still, the search campaign was deemed a success by Aflac and others in the media,
with 12,500 applicants wanting to be the new voice of the duck {The Calgary Herald,
April 27, 2011). As CMO Zuna noted, the company “selected entry 5184 - Dan
McKeague - out of Hugo, Minnesota.” He added, “He’s a terrific guy ... and we’re very
proud to have him represent us” (as quoted in Noer, 2011). Aflac strategically announced
its selection via a press release, Facebook, and Twitter posts from the iconic duck, and
through a YouTube video (2011, April 26).
Comments regarding the organization’s leadership (R2e). There was minimal
mention of the CEO or company’s senior leadership within the studied media articles or
on social media (Facebook and Twitter). On Facebook, some fans were disappointed or
disagreed with Gottfried’s firing, and one fan blamed CMO Zuna by name (Ronald James
Ellis, April 2, 2011). Although the CMO’s media statement about Gottfried’s tweet
appeared in 25% of the articles, only two of the 85 articles studied referenced Aflac’s
CEO in the headline; and even in these cases, the comments were more focused on the
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financial impact of the tsunami rather than the issue regarding the Gottfried tweets or the
Aflac duck.
Comments regarding the organization’s brand (R2f). Aflac prides itself in
being recognized by the Ethisphere Institute as one of the world’s most ethical companies
(March 16, 2011). In the company’s press release promoting its fifth consecutive year on
the Ethisphere list, Aflac’s Chairman and CEO commented, "Honesty, integrity and
transparency are long-held values" of the Aflac brand. Aflac’s management of this crisis
reflected its brand values; but it is the iconic duck, not the CEO, who is the voice of that
brand. In fact, the Aflac duck regularly posts comments on Facebook and Twitter, and it
is the Aflac duck that is featured prominently in the company’s television commercials
and other marketing campaigns.
Aflac recognized that it had a unique opportunity to secure a “new voice” for its
brand, but the duck itself needed to maintain the same degree of integrity. In the
company’s March 24, 2011 press release, CMO Zuna called the job opening “the best job
available in America today,” but he also explained:
Being the new voice of the Aflac Duck carries responsibilities far beyond
recording duck sounds. The Aflac Duck symbolizes our promise to be there in
times of need. It represents the philanthropy and the ethical values embraced by
our employees and more than 72,000 independent sales agents across the nation,
so we are looking for the best person to help advance our brand and business in a
way that demonstrates our values.
The media echoed much of the same sentiment regarding the organization’s
attempt to protect its long-standing and reputable brand:
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•

“Aflac decided to try to create some positive publicity after the incident by
conducting a nationwide audition to find Mr. Gottfried’s successor ... Aflac
executives emphasized that the winner would have to be a worthy
representative of the company’s values in addition to being an effective voice
over actor” (Elliott, The New York Times, April 27, 2011);

•

“The brand is steering clear of anyone who might be remotely edgy ... the
new voice talent must align with Aflac’s image as philanthropic with high
ethical standard” (Wasserman, Maskable, March 23, 2011); and

•

“The difference here is that Gottfried is associated with a corporation and
involved in part of the millions they spend on creating an image” (Gandelman,
The Moderate Voice blog, March 14, 2011).

In this case, the Aflac brand name was mentioned in less than half (48%) of the
studied articles’ headlines. Also of note (see Table 5.3), over 25% specifically mentioned
social media or Twitter in the headline, and 36% referenced Gottfried in the headline.
Therefore, a majority (61%) of the studied articles referenced Gottfried and/or social
media in the “crisis” headline as compared to 48% using the organization’s name.
Table 5.3: Media Headlines for Aflac Crisis March 14 - May 15, 2011
% Referenced Brand in
Headline
48%

%

Referenced Social Media
in Headline
26%

% Referenced Gottfried in
Headline
36%

Table 5.4 offers another perspective on how the print and online media covered
this particular crisis event. This table identifies the percentage of articles coded by the
researcher as either “positive,” “negative,” or “neutral” in overall tone. An example of a
positive article would be when the article is upbeat and features positive comments about
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the brand such as “Aflac has handled the difficult situation pretty well, i.e. with some
humor as well as contrition” (Nudd, Adfreak, March 23, 2011). Table 5.4 also captures
the percentage of articles, per media type, that were particularly critical of Gilbert
Gottfried’s jokes/tweets. Of note, an overwhelming 98% of the articles were coded either
positive or neutral in tone, and, interestingly, the public relations media were the only
media that were not critical of Gottfried’s tweets.
Table 5.4: Media Coverage of Aflac Crisis
Aflac Media

Business

T o ta l A rticles

Percent

Percent

Percent

Percent

R e v iew e d

P o sitiv e l o n e

N eu tral T o n e

N eg a tiv e

C r itic a l o f

Tone

G o ttfried

11

27%

73%

N/A

18%

9

22%

67%

11%

N/A

49

2%

96%

2%

27%

Global M edia

16

19%

81%

N/A

25%

T O T A L

85

11%

87%

2%

22%

M edia(U .S.)
PR/Tech
M edia
Consum er
M edia

As for Aflac’s social media fans or followers, some of the public’s postings have
already been noted. Still, there were those that specifically referenced the brand. These
too were mixed in sentiment:
•

Carey Henshaw Cannon, March 15, 2011 - “I say ‘good riddance’ even
without the off-color comments about Japan. He just doesn’t fit the Aflac
image. I could see Jeff Foxworthy fitting the ‘bill’;”

•

Rob ToIf, March 16, 2011 - “No one could be as good a voice as Gilbert, this
was a mistake Aflac;” and
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•

Steven Lowell, March 22, 2011 - “Hey, good luck with the search, and
completely respect your company turning this into a positive outlet to help
others.”

Post-crisis event online communications practices (R2g).
Aflac continues to utilize its web site and social media channels as ongoing
communication vehicles to reach key publics - including the company’s customers and
social media “fans.” As of April, 2012, the Aflac duck currently has over 313,000
followers on Facebook and over 14,500 followers on Twitter. On average, the Aflac
duck posts at least once a day and sometimes will post as often as seven times per day. It
should be noted that when reviewing post-crisis Twitter posts (September, 2011), there
was some evidence that the ghost writer for the Aflac duck read the comments posted and
has responded “thanks for helping to spread the word” with some of his followers.
Use of two-way communication with key publics (R2c and R2d): For the
studied timeframe, this research found no evidence of two-way symmetrical
communication between Aflac and its key publics. Certainly, Aflac engaged key publics
in a strategic way in order to generate a conversation about the brand. But the company
was on a mission to “create a buzz,” and it neither appeared to react to Gottfried’s
immediate apology nor publicly acknowledged any of the “in defense of Gottfried”
comments from his fellow comedians such as Howard Stern, Joan Rivers, or Whoopi
Goldberg (William-Ross, LAist, March 15, 2011 and TVSquad, March 15, 2011).
Understanding the Global Perspective
Organization’s global crisis approach: Ethnocentric, polycentric, hybrid
approaches (R3a and R3b). In a review of the organization’s web site, Facebook page,
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and blog, there is no clear evidence that Aflac managed or communicated about this issue
any differently in other countries. However, it should be noted once again that Gottfried
was not the voice of the duck in Japan.
Still, interestingly, there were two nearly identical articles released by the same
author on the same day (Ken Belson, April 16, 2011), yet one published in a United
States based newspaper (The New York Times) and the other in a global media outlet (The
International Herald Tribune). Although both articles were approximately 1100 words in
length and the narrative was 95% the same (discussing how Aflac’s management of the
crisis followed a Japanese cultural approach), there were two stark differences - the
article headline and a paragraph about Gilbert Gottfried. The International Herald
Tribune’s version was entitled, “U.S. insurer takes a Japanese approach after disaster;
Steps Aflac has taken reflect country’s call for sacrifice and humility.” This article noted
how, after the tragedy in Japan, Aflac had both purchased newspaper ads expressing
messages of condolence to the earthquake and tsunami victims, and given its customers a
six-month grace period to pay owed insurance premiums. The article was
overwhelmingly positive in its description of Aflac’s management of this tragic event.
Conversely, the The New York Times article’s headline was, “After the disasters in Japan,
a stoic response from Aflac.” Again, it was the same author and included most of the
same content as the Tribune’s, but, in this version, there was a paragraph noting how “not
everyone involved with Aflac has been as sensitive.” The author noted how Gottfried’s
jokes about the disaster “were not widely reported in Japan,” although the company fired
Gottfried, citing a morals clause, even though he had issued a public apology (para. 19).
One cannot draw concrete conclusions about the differences between these two versions,
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but it is worth noting that the country origin of the media outlet can influence the writing
style or approach.
Summary of Findings
Overall, the media was fairly complimentary of Aflac’s management of this
particular crisis issue. As noted, 98% reported on the matter in either a neutral or positive
tone, and a public relations association leader commended Aflac on taking “expedient
and decisive measures.” Additionally, others have congratulated Aflac for being able to
“quack the social media code” (Bauer, March 30, 2011), and advanced sentiments such
as, “It’s a remarkable tale of crisis management - probably the best I have heard in my
entire career” (Noer, Forbes, June 6, 2011). It should also be noted that, although they
did not win, Aflac was in 2012 named a finalist in PRWeek’s Annual Awards for “Crisis
or Issues Management Campaign of the Year” (PRWeek, 2012). Still, Aflac had its share
of dissenters, especially those who revealed that Gottfried had a previous history as an
offensive comedian; and, on social media, many members of the general public also came
to his defense.
From a communications standpoint, Aflac’s leadership and public relations staff
adhered to several of the research-based crisis management best practices previously
noted in this thesis. For example, this research found:
•

Aflac reacted quickly to the crisis. It appreciated the speed of the viral
environment and decided to get ahead of the issue, framing the situation in
a way that was able to protect the company’s long-standing brand;
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•

Aflac’s senior management played a key role as crisis spokespersons,
particularly the chief marketing officer and the company’s head of
corporate communications; and

•

Aflac kept its key publics such as the media and its global customers
informed through a wide variety of communication channels.

Still, even though Aflac may be ahead of many other organizations in its use of
social media as a proactive and reactive communication vehicle, there is no evidence that
the company has embraced Grunig’s two-way symmetrical communication model.
Further, the crisis appears to have been managed in the same manner (ethnocentric
approach) for all affected global publics.
Finally, with regard to Coombs’ SCCT, Coombs never advocated for an
“inform/rebuild” strategy. In fact, this case is so unique in how it came about and in how
it was managed that Coombs’ theory does not seem relevant or applicable. A review of
Coombs’ crisis theory and its applicability to current crisis events will be discussed in
Chapter 6.
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Chapter 6: Discussion, Limitations, and Conclusion
This research sought to better understand how international organizations are
managing crisis situations within today’s global and viral media environment. By
studying two specific crisis cases, the findings noted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 revealed
many differences in crisis management, despite the fact that both crises initiated from
sources beyond the organization’s immediate control. This chapter compares these two
cases and examines various outcomes resulting from these crisis events. Then, using the
insights gleaned from both crises, this chapter explores whether or not primary theoretical
frameworks such as Coombs SCCT and Grunig’s “excellence” model help to inform
actual public relations practice for organizations facing real-time crisis issues. Finally,
this chapter offers best practices for implementing a global crisis communication strategy
using social media and discusses global implications for the public relations field,
including considerations for future research.
Comparative Analysis
By examining crisis communication from a triangulated perspective - the
organization, the media (traditional print and online), and other key publics (including the
organization’s customers) - this research addressed three key concerns:
•

RQ1 : How have specific contemporary international organizations handled
crisis events?

•

RQ2: What role did emerging media play in these organizational crisis
events?

•

RQ3 : Did these contemporary organizations demonstrate a global perspective
in handling crisis events?
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For the two international organizations selected for this research, the findings
revealed several different practices in crisis management (RQ1) and in the companies’
uses of emerging/social media during the crisis events (RQ2). In the Sony PlayStation
case, the organization appeared unprepared or caught off-guard by this crisis issue, even
though it faced a similar issue previously and company executives were well aware that
the organization was a favorite target for outside hackers. Aflac, on the other hand,
presented itself in a “take charge” manner, ensuring that the company and not other key
publics would frame and control the crisis conversation. Additionally, although Sony
fluctuated in its crisis response strategies (something that Coombs’ SCCT does not
recommend), the real issue - the reason the crisis escalated - was that Sony failed to
respond in a timely manner. Although the company executives disagreed with the
timeliness argument, this research revealed ample evidence that both the media and Sony
PSN customers became more frustrated as time passed without comment from Sony. As
a result of differences in crisis management approach, the outcomes in media coverage
and online conversations among key global publics were also quite different.
With regard to the organizations’ uses of new or social media, both Sony
PlayStation and Aflac had a strong web and social media presence prior to their
respective crisis events. However, only Aflac took advantage of online communication
channels to help effectively manage its crisis issue and maintain its strong brand. In fact,
Aflac immediately began to use social media proactively in order to move the
conversation into a different direction - “who wants to be the new voice of our brand?”
It seems logical to conclude that Aflac was successful in part because it was guided by a
corporate communications team that was alert to online conversations, and the team was
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empowered to respond quickly and effectively. Sony PSN on the other hand, let other
key publics control the messages of its powerful brand, leaving many to question Sony’s
security practices and regard for its customers.
Finally, this research explored whether these organizations demonstrated a global
perspective in the company’s crisis management (RQ3). Interestingly, the two
companies have shared geographic interests as Sony PlayStation has its corporate
headquarters located in Japan, and Aflac has a division named ‘'Aflac Japan” as 75% of
its revenue share comes from the Japanese market. Still, although the findings indicate
that both organizations recognize their global customers through dedicated web sites and
social networks (for the countries where the company has international interests), each
took an ethnographic approach with respect to crisis management practices. It should be
noted, however, that in the Sony PlayStation case, since the data breach took place in the
United States, the company did offer affected customers identity theft protection.
It would be unfair to compare these two crisis events in terms of severity.
Certainly, a cyber attack impacting 77 million customers is more serious and potentially
difficult to manage than one person’s posting on a Twitter account. Still, regardless of
the severity of the issue, both crises had the potential to incur long-term damage to the
organizations’ reputations or brands. Organizational crises do not occur in a vacuum, as
one event has the ability to trigger another. For instance, Sony’s crisis had a dual effect —
it both exposed the company as being vulnerable to outside hackers and left 77 million
customers wondering if their identity would be stolen. This then led members of
Congress to question whether legislation was needed to better protect consumers by
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quickly notifying them when personal data has been stolen. Such legislation would have
long-term implications for the industry and for businesses everywhere.
Ultimately, the variance in the crisis management resulted in different outcomes.
In its reporting of a fourth consecutive year of net losses, Sony indicated that 10% of its
PSN customers no longer use the service, and the CEO at the helm during the crisis was
asked to step down (Benedetti, 2011 and Waugh, 2012). Table 6.1 summarizes the
variances in approach and Table 6.2 provides specific distinctions in outcomes.
Table 6.1: Comparing Crisis Management Practices
Event

Sony PlayStation

Aflac

Cyber attack from
external agent

Paid contractor posted jokes on
personal Twitter account

Reactive

Proactive

Organization Response Time

A few days

A few hours

Organization Announcements

Issued 5 press releases
(all issued two weeks
after crisis occurred)

Issued 4 press releases
(first one within 24
hours/announced crisis event)

Limited use

Strategically used spokespersons
to communicate messages
broadly

Crisis Issue
Crisis Management Style

Use of Company Spokespersons
Social Media Usage During Crisis
Coombs’ SCCT Strategy Applied
Two-way symmetrical
communication

Extensive use

Minimal use
Deny-Scapegoat/
Rebuild

Inform/Rebuild

No evidence

No evidence

Table 6.2: Comparing Crisis Management Outcomes
Sony PlayStation
Brand name in 87% of crisis headlines
52% of print/online articles
negative in tone
Company CEO fired one year later; 10% of
customers no longer use service

Aflac
•
Brand name in 48% of crisis headlines
2% of print/online articles
negative in tone
Brand recognized by PR industry
as finalist for
best crisis campaign of the year
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Analysis of crisis frameworks. In reviewing these cases from the perspective of
Coombs’ SCCT and Grunig’s two-way symmetrical communication model, neither
organization appeared to adhere to these highly regarded best practices in crisis
communication. However, after spending extensive time reviewing these cases from the
lens of both research-based theories, I submit that neither is fully practical or absolutely
necessary. First let me clarify that I am not defending the steps or actions taken by either
organization. But, as I studied both cases, I tried to envision myself on Sony’s or Aflac’s
corporate communications team and pondered how I, as a trained and experienced
communication professional, might have managed either crisis event. Furthermore, I
questioned how applicable these specific crisis frameworks are in today’s highly viral and
global environment.
Between the case studies noted in the literature review and the two cases analyzed
in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, it should be evident that the dynamics of any crisis event
have changed greatly due to the emergence of online and social media. Therefore, the
management of these issues must change too. Even Coombs acknowledged:
A crisis management plan (CMP) is a reference tool, not a blueprint. A CMP
provides lists of key contact information, reminders of what typically should be
done in a crisis, and forms to be used to document the crisis response. A CMP is
not a step-by-step guide to how to manage a crisis. (2007, October 30)
In my opinion, the same could be said for the SCCT, which can be confusing to follow
but more importantly does not adequately address all potential crisis issues - especially in
the Aflac case. This crisis issue does not fit any of the SCCT’S four victim categories
because Gottfried was a paid contractor and therefore not an external agent of the
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company. Nor was this case accidental or even preventable (where the organization
“knowingly placed people at risk”). Since this crisis is closest to the victim cluster, the
SCCT recommends that crisis managers utilize either instructing information alone or a
deny crisis response strategy. But Aflac did not “deny” or even try to “diminish” as it
never claimed lack of control over the event. Rather, the company employed a strategy
that would equate to Coombs’ inform/rebuild approach. Yet according to Coombs
(2007), the rebuild strategy is not always the preferred response; the more
accommodative the strategy, the more expensive it is for the organization (p. 172). That
is not likely to be true in Aflac’s case because Aflac utilized social media as the primary
communication vehicle.
Before moving on to the next theory, I would take one moment to further offer
why Coombs’ SCCT was confusing to follow. First, there are too many crisis strategy
options that seemingly overlap yet actually vary when previous organizational history is
considered. Also, the naming and definitions of the crisis response strategies is
important. In common definitions of the words “Deny/Scapegoat ” and
“Diminish/Excuse” one might expect the strategies to be similar. Yet with the former,
the crisis manager blames some person or group outside the organization for the crisis;
and with the latter, the crisis manager minimizes organizational responsibility by denying
intent to do harm. The use of the word “deny” in two separate and distinct crisis
strategies may confuse practitioners and prohibit the critical application of Coombs’
model in real crisis cases.
With respect to Grunig’s et al. (1992) “excellence” theory, there was no evidence
of either company engaging in two-way symmetrical communication before, during, or
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after the crisis event. But is this even necessary? Grunig has argued that public relations
professionals with the expertise, strategic insight, and propensity toward two-way
symmetrical communication will ultimately build stronger relationships and reputational
assets with key publics. And if excellence in public relations is measured by the quality
of relationships that an organization builds with its key publics, then social media can
better enable the ideal of two-way communication because key publics can absorb and
respond to communications in a comfortable environment (Schultz, Utz, & Goritz, 2010).
Grunig, however, has not simply advocated for two-way dialogue. He and his colleagues
are advocating for two-way symmetrical communication where the public and
organizational interests are balanced - “a give-and-take relationship” - particularly in
times of crisis (Hagan, 2007, p. 422). Sony and Aflac were likely concerned about their
key publics. But if Sony had truly regarded its customers’ interests, then it would have
informed its customers of the breach —and potential identity theft - much sooner. Even
in Aflac’s case, the company recognized an opportunity to further promote the brand
through free media coverage, and it took advantage of it. Considering Aflac’s generally
positive outcome, it would be difficult to argue for the ideal of two-way symmetrical
communication when an approach of simply engaging in timely and open communication
achieved positive results for the organization and its publics.
Finally, it is important to discuss the media’s framing of these two crisis issues.
For one, in the Aflac case, the media followed the company’s lead. It reported on the
issue using the same language as provided in the company’s press releases, and it helped
to provide free promotion for the company’s campaign to find its new voice. However,
in the Sony case, for nearly two weeks the media was left to speculate about what was
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going on and why the PSN service had yet to be restored. Sony’s silence allowed the
media to frame the crisis, which resulted in a majority of articles (52%) being negative in
tone (as compared to 2% for Aflac). One further note is the sometimes distinct and subtle
differences in the portrayal of crisis events by U.S.-based media versus media in other
countries. This research identified a few instances of these varying reporting styles and,
considering the global implications to a brand, additional research examining these
differences should be explored.
Implications for Public Relations in an Online, Global World
Crisis communication has been the core of public relations theory and practice for
decades (Grunig et al., 1992; Falkheimer & Heide, 2006). Curtin & Gaither (2007)
argued, “Savvy consultants know they can rely on their professional experience, but they
must also be open and adaptable to that which is foreign to them” (p. 258). It has been
common practice for public relations to play a critical role in developing crisis messages
and in preparing company spokespersons to handle questions from the news media. In
fact, the media relations element of public relations has been a highly valued skill in
crisis management (Coombs, 2007, October 30). But communication needs to be a
reciprocal process that better enables mutual understanding between an organization and
its key publics (Falkheimer & Heide, 2006, p. 187). In order for this industry to remain
relevant and instrumental in crisis management, practitioners cannot be surprised or
unresponsive to negative comments posted on social media. If they are truly protectors
of an organization’s brand, then they must fully engage in social media and ensure that
their organization’s leaders are knowledgeable of the risks and that are prepared to
respond quickly.
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The most dramatic outcome of emerging media and globalization is that the speed
and reach of communication has forever changed. Consequently, organizations are more
vulnerable to crisis issues that can blossom in a digital environment and are subjected to
an accelerated news cycle (i.e., 24 hour cable news and a variety of online social
networks). Still, as public relations professionals consider ways to address today’s
challenges, it should be noted that most communication experts are not advocating for
major departures from traditional crisis plans. For instance, a review of
recommendations offered before and after the emergence of social media shows that most
crisis experts still advocated that an organization’s crisis plan should:
•

Identify and prepare for a wide range of potential crisis situations;

•

Identify and properly train a crisis response team. The team should meet
regularly and should include representatives from management, legal,
human resources, finance, and communications;

•

Consider and provide a cost analysis for what might be legally mandated
(e.g. identity theft protection); and

•

Stage crisis readiness simulations (Scudder, 2012).

What has changed is that now we need to consider how to update these plans in
order to effectively integrate social media to support and enhance an organization’s
communication efforts (Semple, 2009; Borremans, 2010). Likewise, the challenges of
international crisis communication must also be addressed (Coombs & Holladay, 2012).
In fact, Coombs (2012) has supported the argument presented by others (Curtin &
Gaither, 2007) by stating that “crisis managers must resist the temptation to apply
ethnocentric crisis communication solutions” (p. 723). Again, if public relations
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professionals desire to remain relevant in this complex world, it is necessary to accept
and adapt to change. As Coombs (Coombs & Holladay, 2012) noted, culture is a distinct
factor that can alter stakeholder perceptions and reactions; therefore it is essential for
communication professionals to understand how various cultural factors impact the crisis
communication process and its outcomes (pp. 722-723).
Certainly, the crisis communication frameworks that have been discussed
throughout this thesis are still useful in preparation for crisis events; however, more
research is needed. Coombs (2012) has acknowledged the need for further testing of the
SCCT as only a small percentage of its crisis recommendations have been tested to date
(p. 722). And Curtin & Gaither (2007) cautioned that current research has served to
mainly identify challenges to international public relations rather than extending theory
or discussing effective practices (p. 19). Of course, this has not and should not prevent
other communication experts from offering advice to modem day practitioners striving to
address the challenges of emerging global and viral communications. In fact, many of
these experts have the benefit of a recent crisis experience, and now understand that some
of the same tools that trigger a crisis can also aid in resolving it. The following are
examples of newly recommended best practices for crisis planning:
•

Conduct research to have a greater understanding of an organization’s key
publics. This includes daily monitoring of all that is being said about the
organization (Borremans, 2010). There are many online tools (e.g. search engine
optimization) that enable such monitoring; and this critical information will help
to better guide and inform decisions made by the organization during a crisis;
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•

Understand the new media tools that are available today and actively engage even if this means engaging personally before doing so professionally. Next, start
building the organizations’ online commimities through two-way communication
(Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008; Semple, 2009);

•

Create “dark sites” —a hidden web site with pertinent information that can easily
be turned on during a crisis (Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008; Borremans, 2010);

•

Use the organization’s intranet site to create an online crisis manual which is
easier to update and can enable quicker communication activities to internal and
external stakeholders, including the media (Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008);

•

Recalibrate your organization’s response time and level of transparency. Be
prepared to respond to key publics in the moment and be prepared to manage
negative comments and “respond to questions with grace” (PR Newswire, 2011,
p. 8); and

•

Consider your global audiences. Understand how different cultures will perceive
certain actions taken by the organization (Borremans, 2010).
For some organizations that are more comfortable with controlling messages and

engaging in “one-way” communication, these steps may be a significant departure from
previous practices. However, it is the public relations professional’s responsibility to
guide an organization toward these best practices by demonstrating how building
relationships with key publics can both establish credibility and help to contain or even
prevent a crisis (Gonzalez-Herrero & Smith, 2008). Be prepared to provide specific
examples of organizations that failed to appreciate the power of social media and, in turn,
suffered through negative media coverage throughout the world. Conversely, the Aflac
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crisis case should serve as a model for how a corporate communications team functioned
as strategic partners to the company’s senior management, and how this team effectively
guided the organization through an online crisis issue. Lastly, it has become increasingly
important to demonstrate to senior management how the organization’s current
employees are already actively engaging in social networks and are frequently expressing
opinions about their employer on YouTube or among their circle of "‘friends.” Rather
than viewing this as a major concern or a loss of productivity, savvy organizations are
recognizing that employees can serve as a company’s best brand advocates - especially
in an online environment.
Research Limitations
This research sought to examine the role of emerging media in global crisis
communications. However, case study research has clear limitations. First, this research
only studied two specific cases that are not representative of all international brands.
Further, in reviewing these cases, the researcher was the sole media coder, the media
analyzed was not comprehensive, and the data sets did not include the companies’
internal communications during the time of crisis. In fact, the narrative of both crisis
events was externally focused as this research did not ascertain how the crisis was
negotiated internally (i.e. what steps were recommended versus what actions were taken).
This research also does not prove any causal relationship between online communication,
crisis best practices, and global reputation. Still, by examining the crisis management
actions taken by these organizations and the subsequent reaction from print and online
media as well as other global publics, this thesis has revealed inconsistencies in overall
crisis management and incongruence between public relations theory and practice.
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Conclusion
President John F. Kennedy once said, '‘When written in Chinese, the word ‘crisis’
is composed of two characters. One represents danger and the other represents
opportunity” (Brainy Quote). As conveyed throughout this thesis, today’s organizational
crises are taking place in a highly viral and increasingly global environment. It is
therefore incumbent upon the organization and its public relations professionals to fully
understand and appreciate the organizational risks and rewards. Through effective social
media engagement, organizations have the ability to build relationships with key publics,
and can anticipate or manage issues before they escalate to the crisis level. However, this
research has shown that in order for the public relations profession to be viewed as an
essential and strategic component of any organization, its practitioners need to accelerate
their own understanding and comfort level with emerging media. Additionally, as the
practice of international public relations is on the rise, the profession must engage in
scholarly research on social media usage and its global implications on brand reputations
- particularly in times of crisis.
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Network

VentureBeat

5/20/2011

21

Sony's PlayStation Network outage costs $171M

VentureBeat

5/23/2011

22

Just how frustrated are PlayStation Network users
over downtime?

VentureBeat

5/24/2011

23

Microsoft applies lessons from PlayStation
Network downtime: don't hunt hackers

VentureBeat

5/28/2011

24

Week in review: How frustrated are PlayStation
Networks users about downtime?

VentureBeat

5/28/2011

25

PBS NewsHour hackers turn eyes to Sony

VentureBeat

6/1/2011

26

PBS Hackers: we cracked Sony Pictures,
compromised 1M accounts

VentureBeat

6/2/2011

1

Sony set for launch of iPad rival

Financial Times (Europe)

4/27/2011

2

Sony prepares to join tablet race

Financial Times (Asia)

4/27/2011

3

Sony loses face over theft of PS3 data

Financial Times (Asia)

4/28/2011

4

Sony faces anger over delays in revealing
PlayStation data theft

Financial Times (London)

4/28/2011

5

Sony faces fire over hackers

Financial Times (London)

4/28/2011

6

Sony faces fury over hacked data delay

Financial Times (Asia)

4/28/2011

7

Sony users face long odds in hacking suits

Financial Times (Asia)

4/29/2011

8

Grand theft data

Financial Times (Asia)

4/30/2011

9

Storing too much information; Consumers should
be more aware of internet data issues

Financial Times (Asia)

5/3/2011

Financial Times (London)

5/4/2011

11

Is Sony right to take its time to reveal security
breaches?
Veteran hackers point finger over Sony incursion;
PlayStation data breach

Financial Times (London)

5/7/2011

12

Banks wait to react to Sony fraud

Financial Times (London)

5/7/2011

Tough test for game chief to hit next level; news
analysis

Financial Times (London)

5/7/2011

Sony hit by fresh security problems

Financial Times (London)

5/19/2011

15

Hackers continue to plague Sony

Financial Times (Asia)

5/26/2011

16

Spying rife as web adds to risks

Financial Times (London)

10

13
14

6/2/2011
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M ed ia Source

R elease D a te

17

United States massive data breach suspected in
Sony PlayStation hacker attack

Thai Press Reports

18

Pressure to quit builds on Sony's Stringer

The Daily Telegraph

5/4/2011

19

Sony closes gaming site after second security
breach

New Zealand Herald

5/4/2011

20

The only hack-free zone is offline

Business Day (South Africa)

5/4/2011

21

PSP FIR

Indian Express

5/6/2011

22

Evening Standard

5/6/2011

23

Sony's Stringer finally issues security apology
Sony’s Howard Stringer issues apology letter for
network breach

The Business Insider

5/6/2011

24

Media a game that Sony must win - the hacking of
Sony's PlayStation Network was blow to global
giant

The Guardian

5/9/2011

25

Sony to offer $1M insurance policies to U.S.
gamers impacted by massive cyber breach

BestWire

5/11/2011

26

Report: Sony Music Japan, Sony Ericsson hacked

CNET.com

5/24/2011

27

Sony tells Congress it acted promptly on data
breach

The Phillipines News Agency

6/3/2011

28

Hackers break into Sony’s security again

International Business Times
News

6/3/2011

29

Will Sony address the elephant in the room at E3?

International Business Times
News

6/3/2011

30

Under-fire Sony in New Data Breach by hackers

Irish Independent

6/4/2011

4/28/2011

Business Media
PR/Trade Media
Global Media
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Appendix B - Aflac Media List

1

A rticle T itle

M ed ia Source

When the marketing reach of social media
backfires

R elease D ate

The New York Times

3/15/2011

The New York Times

3/16/2011

3

Tallying the financial aftermath: Japan
government likely to bear big monetary loss
Twitter? Mayor’s gaffes come the old-fashioned
way

The New York Times

3/18/2011

4

Corporate missteps in social media

The New York Times

3/24/11

5

The New York Times

4/6/11

6

A noisy casting call as thousands quack for Aflac
After the disasters in Japan, a stoic response from
Aflac

The New York Times

4/16/11

7

When publicists says “shh!”

The New York Times

4/17/11

8

A new voice for the Aflac duck

The New York Times

4/27/11

9

The New York Times

4/29/11

10

Relieved by earnings, investors send shares up
Hertz uses mascot in effort to make rental cars
cool

The New York Times

5/4/2011

11

Laughs and gaffes

The New York Times

5/15/2011

1

Aflac cans Gilbert Gottfried for Japan jokes

Ad freak

3/14/2011

2

Want to be the next voice of the Aflac duck?

Adfreak

3/23/2011

3

Auditions for Aflac duck not going that well

Adfreak

4/6/2011

4

Gilbert Gottfried fired over Japan jokes on Twitter

Mashable

3/15/2011

Mashable

3/15/2011

Mashable

3/22/2011

Mashable

3/23/2011

Mashable

4/26/2011

Mashable

5/15/2011

Benzinga

3/14/2011

Consumerist

3/14/2011

2

6

The 5 biggest stories in tech, business & media
this morning
5 tips for maintaining brand consistency across
social media

7

Aflac holding online casting call to replace Gilbert
Gottfried

5

8
9

Aflac has found its new spokesduck
73 essential social media & tech resources for
small businesses

Aflac fires duck voice guy over “bad taste”
1 Japanese jokes
Gilbert Gottfried loses Aflac duck gig because he
2 thinks the Japan tsunami is hilarious
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3

M edia S ource

Crushable

3/14/2011

EveryJoe

3/14/2011

Gawker

3/14/2011

The Moderate Voice

3/14/2011

PopEater

3/14/2011

The Wrap

3/14/2011

Zennie62

3/14/2011

Digital Journal

3/15/2011

TV Squad

3/15/2011

6

Aflac to Asshat: Gilbert Gottfried fired
Gilbert Gottfried dropped as Aflac duck after
terrible tsunami jokes
Gilbert Gottfried fired by Aflac for Twitter jokes
about Japan

7

Gilbert Gottfried fired as Aflac duck after
insensitive Japan tweets

4
5

8
9

R elea se D ate

A rticle T itle

Parting Tweet: Gilbert Gottfried gets fired for
insensitive Japan comments

Gilbert Gottfried fired as (and apparently was)
Aflac duck
Gilbert Gottfried fired by Aflac for tsunami jokes
on Twitter

11

Aflac fires duck voice actor over tasteless tsunami
tweets
Gilbert Gottfried fired as voice of Aflac duck over
Japanese jokes

12

Gilbert Gottfried apologizes for offensive Japan
tweets

TV Squad

3/15/2011

13

Did Gilbert Gottfried go too far with his Japan
jokes?

TV Squad

3/15/2011

14

Morning news report: March 15, 2011

Blogging with Bryan C. Hanks

3/15/2011

15

If it walks like a duck...

InsureBlog

3/15/2011

EUR/Electronic Urban Report

3/15/2011

Gothamist

3/15/2011

10

17

AFLAC fires Gilbert Gottfried (voice of duck)
over tsunami jokes
Is earthquake a sign from God that celebrities
should STFU?

18

Aflac boots Gottfried as duck voice

Huckleberries Online

3/15/2011

19

Gottfried got fired: Japan jokes cost funnyman
pitch gig

LAist

3/15/2011

20

Aflac fires the guy who does the voice of its duck
for making tasteless Japan jokes on Twitter

The Business Insider

3/15/2011

21

Aflac duck gets fired: “I want a new duck” (video)

The Medical Quack

3/15/2011

22

Gilbert Gottfried has culture after all, he toured
Betsy Ross house

PhillyGossip (Philadelphia
Daily News)

3/15/2011

23

8622: Aflac ducks from Gottfried's tweets

MultiCultClassics

3/15/2011

24

NEPartisan

3/15/2011

25

Japanese victims not shown sympathy
Offensive Gilbert Gottfried dumped by Aflac for
offensive tsunami tweets

Deceiver.com

3/16/2011

26

Social media: You must draw the line before it
can be crossed

The Adaptive Marketer

3/16/2011

16
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R elease D ate

A r ticle T itle

M ed ia S ource

FierceCIO

3/16/2011

28

The perils of Twitter
Gilbert Gottfried fired for tasteless tsunami jokes,
apologizes

Say Anything

3/16/2011

29

The slippery slope of social media accountability

Marketing Tea Party

3/17/2011

30

Hey, Gilbert Gottfried: Offensive jokes about the
Japan tsunami aren’t healthy

Blisstree

3/18/2011

Bozell Column: Japan, just not funny
Bad-taste humor about Japan’s natural disasters:
Our shrink says “survivors only”

Newsbusters.org

3/19/2011

Blisstree

3/22/2011

27

31
32
33

8637: Quacking casting call

MultiCultClassics

3/22/2011

34

Are YOU the next voice of the Aflac duck?

The Business Insider

3/23/2011

35

Dollars and Sense

3/23/2011

36

Unusual job opportunity
Aflac CEO Dan Amos tells Fox Business he
expects Tokyo “will be back within a month or...”

GuruFocu

3/23/2011

37

Casting search is on for unique new voice for
Aflac duck

Digital Journal

3/24/2011

38

Gilbert Gottfried the latest person fired for tweets

3/24/2011

39

Back Stage Blog Stage

3/31/2011

41

How’s your duck voice? AFLAC!
Gilbert Gottfried offends, and now Aflac needs
you
Aflac CEO: We are going to have quite a few
claims in Japan

WalletPop
The Fresno Bee Editorial
Opinion Blog

Wall St. Cheat Sheet

3/31/2011

42

Watch highlights from the Aflac duck audition

Back Stage Blog Stage

4/5/2011

43

Aflac duck finds his new voice

Back Stage Blog Stage

4/26/2011

44

Quick: Duck!
Aflac’s new duck voice is a 36 year-old dad from
Minnesota. He won the gig with an audition he
snuck in as his workplace, radio station KQRS.

InsureBlog

4/26/2011

The Business Insider

4/26/2011

ReadWriteWeb

4/26/2011

PopEater

4/29/2011

PopEater

5/11/2011

The Business Insider

5/16/2011

40

45

Worried about brand damage from social media?
Get Tweet insurance
Gilbert Gottfried faults media for turning his jokes
47 into a firing offense
. Gilbert Gottfried wishes he’d written his book
48 after Aflac fired him
46

49

13 people who got fired for tweeting

3/25/2011

Gilbert Gottfried fired after jokes about the
1 earthquake, tsunami in Japan
Gilbert Gottfried apologizes for making jokes
2 about earthquake, tsunami in Japan

International Business Times
News
International Business Times
News

3/15/2011
3/15/2011
3/15/2011

Our vulgar, new digital world

Edmonton Journal (Alberta)
Guelph Mercury (Ontario,
Canada)
Daily the Pak Banker
International Business Times
News

3/16/2011

6

Aflac severs ties with Gilbert Gottfried
“Family Guy” writer Alec Sulkin joins 50 Cent,
Gottfried on the insensitive Japan quake tweet list

3/16/2011

7

League star in probe over Japan jokes

The New Zealand Herald

3/17/2011

8

How a bad joke can go global; Speed of social
media makes them a minefield for corporate
advertisers

The International Herald
Tribune

3/17/2011

9

Burned by social media’s reach

The Hamilton Spectator
(Ontario, Canada)

3/17/2011

3

Gottfried lays egg, loses Aflac job

4
5

3/16/2011

The Calgary Herald (Alberta)

3/18/2011

11

Tweets, twits, bad timing
Aflac holds open call for new duck voice after
firing

Waterloo Region Record

3/23/2011

12

Twitter’s immediacy can lead to red-faced users
feeling like twits

The Gazette (Montreal)

3/24/2011

13

A new voice to give the Aflac duck its quack back

Daily the Pak Banker

3/27/2011

14

Daily the Pak Banker

4/4/2011

15

Final call for Aflac duck voice online auditions
U.S. insurer takes a Japanese approach after
disaster; Steps Aflac has taken reflect country’s
calls for sacrifice and humility

The International Herald
Tribune

4/16/2011

16

Aflac’s duck gets new voice

The Calgary Herald (Alberta)

4/27/2011

10

Business Media
PR/Trade Media (blogs)
Consumer Media (blogs)
Global Media
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Appendix C: Content Analysis Coding Form
General:
Name o f Organization

___________________________

Month/Year Crisis Event First Reported in Social or Traditional Media

Research Questions:
Rla: What type o f crisis occurred? (select only one)
Victim/Natural Disaster
Accidental/lntemal - process-related
Intentional/Preventable

Rib: Was the crisis incited by or did it emerge as a result o f a social media comment or
posting?
Yes (explain how)
No

Rlc: How quickly did the organization respond to the crisis event?
Within 48 hours
3 or more days

R2a: What presence did the organization have in the online environment at the time of
the crisis event? (Web pages, Facebook, Twitter, blog, etc.)?
Organization’s Social Media General Usage (select all that apply)
Company blog____________
Facebook Fan Page
Twitter Page_____________
Posts company videos online
Company Web site________
Company Web site only
145

No online presence

R2b: Did the organization utilize social media proactively (get ahead of issue and
inform
publics) or reactively (only responded when outside forces - government or
traditional media - pushed a response)?

Organization Proactively Used Social Media (not just company web site) during Crisis
Event (select all that apply)
Yes, Company blog (at least one)
Yes, Facebook Fan Page________
Yes, Twitter Page
______
Yes, Posts company videos online
Yes, other (explain)___________
No

R2e: Was the organization’s leadership (i.e. CEO) negatively reviewed by traditional
and/or online/social media during or after the crisis event?
Yes (explain how)
No evidence

R2f: Was the organization’s brand negatively reviewed by traditional and/or
online/social media during or after the crisis event?
Yes (explain how)
No evidence

R2g: After the crisis event, did the organization implement any changes to its online
communication practices?__________________________________________
Yes, created new social media sites________________________________________
Yes, created new social media content or policies____________________________
No evidence of change_____ _____ _______________________________________
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Appendix D: Textual Analysis Coding Form
General:
Name o f Organization

Research Questions:
Rid: Which situational crisis response strategy (from Coombs ’ Theory) did the
organization first adopt?

Rle: At any time, did the organization change/move away from its initial crisis response
strategy (from Coombs’ Theory)?
Yes, it changed once to ....(explain)_____
Yes, it changed more than once (explain)
Rebuild

Rif: Did the organization handle the crisis proactively (get ahead o f issue and inform
publics) or reactively (only responded when outside forces —government or traditional
media —pushed a response)?
Yes, proactive issues management___________________________________
No, only responded when external force (i.e. traditional media) covered issue

R2c: During the crisis event, did the organization (and its public relations professionals)
engage in two-way communication with key publics (per Grunig’s Theory) in an online
environment?
Yes (explain how)
No evidence

147

R2d: I f “yes ” to R2c, is there evidence to suggest that key public’s behavior/attitudes
were positively impacted by organization engaging in two-way communications?

Yes (explain how)
No evidence

R3a: Is there evidence to suggest that the organization handled the crisis event
differently in other countries?
No, but did offer various language translations (ethnocentric)
No evidence of varying/different communication practices (ethnocentric)
Yes, took very different approaches by country (polycentric)___________
Yes, a mixture of general and local PR principles (hybrid/mixed approach)

R3b: I f “yes ” to R3a, is there evidence to suggest that local and global stakeholder's
perceptions/attitudes were positively impacted by organization handling crisis event
differently in other countries?

Yes (explain how)
No evidence
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